Fordham Law Review
Volume 74

Issue 5

Article 3

2006

An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice
David Gray

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2621 (2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice
Cover Page Footnote
Visting Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University School of law. J.D., New York University School of
Law, 2003; Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2004. The author wishes to thank Richard Kraut, Thomas
McCarthy, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Alex Boraine, Paul van Zyl, Mark Sheldon, Sara Beale, James
Boyle, Doriane Lambelet Coleman, James, Coleman, Madeline Morris, Jedediah Purdy, Richard
Schmalbeck, and Neil Siegel for their comments on this Article in various prior forms. Debts of gratitude
also are owed to Pablo De Greiff for his time and insight, Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr., and Judge Chester
J. Straub for their mentorship and advice, and Bill Nelson, Barry Friedman, Katharine Bartlett, and Stuart
Benjamin for their support and assistance.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss5/3

AN EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH TO
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
David Gray*
INTRODUCTION

Recently, we have been witness to a tsunami. This "third wave" of
liberal revolutions in Asia, Europe, Africa, and South America has begun to
melt away the last frozen remnants of the Cold War.I In the wake of these
revolutions, as nations and states make the transition to democracy,
the
'2
following question arises: "What is to be done about past wrongs?
Transitional regimes, in contrast to their autocratic and abusive
predecessors, are committed to human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law. To make good on these commitments, new states must seek justice for
victims and abusers. Given that "justice" is traditionally understood in
terms of those well-worn coins 3 "responsibility," "crime," and
"punishment," it is no surprise that criminal trials and punishments are
often the standard for justice in transitions. 4 Unfortunately, traditional
theories of criminal jurisprudence have been developed in relatively stable

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. J.D., New York
University School of Law, 2003; Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2004. The author wishes
to thank Richard Kraut, Thomas McCarthy, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Alex Boraine,
Paul van Zyl, Mark Sheldon, Sara Beale, James Boyle, Doriane Lambelet Coleman, James
Coleman, Madeline Morris, Jedediah Purdy, Richard Schmalbeck, and Neil Siegel for their
comments on this Article in various prior forms. Debts of gratitude also are owed to Pablo
De Greiff for his time and insight, Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr., and Judge Chester J. Straub
for their mentorship and advice, and Bill Nelson, Barry Friedman, Katharine Bartlett, and
Stuart Benjamin for their support and assistance.
1. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (1991).
2. Contemporary conversations about transitional justice owe everything to a debate in
print between Professors Diane Orentlicher and Carlos Nino published in the Yale Law
Journal.Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish PastAbuses of Human Rights Put into Context:
The Case of Argentina, 100 Yale L.J. 2619 (1991); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537
(1991) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Settling Accounts]; see Diane F. Orentlicher, A Reply to
ProfessorNino, 100 Yale L.J. 2641 (1991).
3. I allude to an image of truth adopted by philosopher Jacques Derrida from Friedrich
Nietzsche. See Friedrich W. Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, in
Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's, at 79, 92
(Daniel Breazeale trans. & ed., 1979).
4. Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
UnderstandingTransitionalJustice, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 39, 40 (2002).
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states where the ideal is within the reach of aspiration. 5 Alluding to
philosopher John Rawls, author Pablo De Greiff has distinguished
transitions as "very imperfect world[s]."'6 De Greiff notes that efforts to
seek justice in transitions face practical challenges that do not disturb views
from crystalline castles. 7 These considerations usually lead transitions to
pursue "hybrid" programs of justice composed of limited prosecutions
focused on top leaders, 8 official or de facto amnesties, truth commissions,
lustration, and reparations. 9
In transitions, and in transitional justice literature, hybrid programs
usually are compromises born of necessity.' 0 Transitional regimes admit
that it would be better to prosecute all persons who had a hand in past
abuses, but recognize that this is simply not possible." Transitions must
settle for the best justice possible given imperfect circumstances. 12 Some
have characterized the sighs that accompany this view as hysterical
overreaction, mistaking the practical challenges to justice in transitions for
insurmountable obstacles rather than simple variations of challenges
confronted by "ordinary justice."' 13 There are, in fact, few if any
handwringers among those interested in transitional justice. It is true that
faced with the compromises borne of necessity most transitional justice
theorists express understandable regret that "more" justice cannot be
done, 14 but regretting that more cannot be done is not the same as giving up
on justice entirely. 15
This Article charts a different course:
It proposes a transitional
jurisprudence that, though nonideal, is decidedly positive. It argues that the
unique scale of practical challenges to transitional justice present
5. Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of TransitionalJustice: The Case of South Africa's Truth
andReconciliation Commission, 52 J. Int'l Aff. 647, 661 (1999).
6. Pablo De Greiff, InternationalCourts and Transitions to Democracy, 12 Pub. Aff.
Q. 79, 79 (1998); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution 74-75 (1992).
7. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, TransitionalJustice as Ordinary Justice,
117 Harv. L. Rev. 761, 777-825 (2004).
8. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2602-04.
9. Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and
Reconciliation, in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions 3, 7 (Robert I.

Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
10. See id.
11. See van Zyl, supra note 5, at 661.
12. See Michel Rosenfeld, Restitution, Retribution, Political Justice and the Rule of
Law, 2 Constellations 309, 310 (1996).
13. See generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7. Sweeping aside the madness,

Professors Eric Posner and Adrienne Vermeule characterize challenges to justice in
transition as differing from the humdrum problems faced by stable states only in terms of
scale. Transitional justice is just "ordinary justice."
The corresponding advice to
transitional justice practitioners is to grin and bear it. That is slim comfort. More important,
it ignores the distinctive conditions of abusive regimes that are bound to problems of scale,
which, when properly accounted for, provide significant guidance for a transitional
jurisprudence.
14. See Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in
Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 235, 237-40.
15. See id. at 240.
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jurisprudential problems that are not satisfied by treating transitional justice
as ordinary justice. 16 In particular, this Article emphasizes the importance
of recognizing that pre-transitional states are not simply crime ridden,
occupied by awesome numbers of entrepreneurial and independent
criminals. Rather, an abusive regime is defined by social norms, a
particular ontology, and a historical teleology that, operating through
official state agents, construct a public face of law that sanctions and17
organizes violence perpetrated by institutional actors and private citizens.
This approach appreciates that settling for the "best justice possible" leaves
8
transitional justice theorists and practitioners understandably dissatisfied.'
Contrary to the "ordinary justice" approach, however, it contends that this
discomfort is symptomatic of attempts to shoehorn stable-state justice
theories into transitions while failing to appreciate that defining features of
transitions and pre-transitional abuses have normative significance. 19
Transitional justice is an exercise in "nonideal" theory. 20 As such, it
must take positive account of the unique circumstances found in transitions
21
and their predecessor regimes in constructing a transitional jurisprudence.
By examining the unique conditions in societies capable of mass and
institutionalized atrocities, this Article argues that most of those implicated
in past wrongs should qualify for an affirmative legal excuse. Further, it

16. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice 3 (2000) (arguing that transitional justice is a
function of the unique political dynamics and democratic goals of transitions to democracy).
17. See Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and
the Holocaust 21 (1996); Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We
Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories From Rwanda 96, 115 (1998); Aukerman, supra
note 4, at 59. The content and role of the public face of law in abusive regimes is discussed
at greater length in Part 11. For the present, it is sufficient to point out that laws on the books
have no meaning independent of prevalent socio-normative commitments. The content and
meaning of a law against murder, for example, depends on a social ontology that describes
the extension of "human" or "person." A defining feature of abusive regimes is that, in light
of dominate socio-ontological categories, laws on the books provide protection for some
classes but not for others-those targeted for abuse cannot be "murdered" because they are
subhuman. See Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality,and Sentimentality, in On Human
Rights 11, 112-15 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993).
18. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, The Moral Foundationsof Truth Commissions,
in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 22, 27 (pointing
out that limited prosecutions entail "political decision[s] with moral implications").
19. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition,
13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 261, 261-66 (2003) (discussing various scales of "transition,"
and recognizing that massive systemic shifts on the scale that revolutions present are unique
practical and normative challenges).
20. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 5, 106-13 (1999). Transitional regimes are heir to
what philosopher John Rawls would call "unfavorable conditions," which, as he might
argue, set normative limitations on justice in transitions.
21. While transitional justice literature is rife with descriptive efforts documenting these
unique conditions, this Article occupies a unique position in trying to take normative account
of the defining features of transitions. See Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional
Justice in Historical Perspective, at xi, 79-80 (2004) (assuming a decidedly descriptive
approach to transitional justice and refraining from a normative conclusion). But see Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 7, at 763-65 (arguing that the conditions of transitions are neither
unique nor demanding of a unique normative analysis).
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describes how centering transitional justice programs on the proper
provision of such an excuse justifies hybrid programs composed of
vertically limited trials, truth commissions, and reparations as the best, not
22
just the best possible, justice in transitions.
The excuse-centered approach advanced in this Article depends on the
sustainability of this excuse. This Article focuses on that task. Part I
details the "justice gap" that is the defining concern of transitional justice.
Part II explores the normative significance of this gap, arguing that mass
atrocities necessarily are correlated with a public face of law that provides
abusers, in their roles as public agents, warrant for believing that their acts
are right, necessary, or at least not subject to punishment. Given this, Part
II concludes that, with the exception of high-level leaders, most of those
living under an abusive public face of law should qualify for an affirmative
excuse based on the legality principal. Parts III and IV defend the proposed
excuse against challenges from deontological and consequentialist legal
theories respectively. Part V provides a sketch of how the excuse, placed at
the center of a transitional justice program, provides both justification and
practical guidance for truth commissions. While a full defense of truth
commissions is beyond the scope of this Article, Part V also indicates how
the proposed approach solves some of the most pernicious challenges to
truth commissions and "restorative justice." 2 3
I. THE JUSTICE GAP: PRACTICAL LIMITS ON CRIMINAL TRIALS IN
TRANSITIONS

Among the most striking features of ancin regimes24 are widespread
complicity and broad participation in abuses. 2 5 Political leaders, military
personnel, executive officials, and police are among the most notorious
culprits, 26 but they only mark the surface. Innumerable acts of unofficial
27
violence, petty abuse, and discrimination characterize abusive regimes.
The histories of these regimes are punctuated by murderous rampages

22. This argument has not been made sufficiently in the literature on transitional justice,
but it is necessary for a satisfying transitional jurisprudence. See Gutmann & Thompson,
supra note 18, at 26-27; Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2 at 2603.
23. See generally Desmond Mpilo Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (1999);
Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on
RestorativeJustice, in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9,
at 68; Jennifer Llewelyn, Justicefor South Africa: Restorative Justice and the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in Moral Issues in Global Perspective 96 (Christine
Koggel ed., 1999).

24. 1 take the term ancin regimes from Professor Ruti Teitel, who uses it throughout
TransitionalJustice. Teitel, supra note 16. In addition, I refer to these regimes variously as
"predecessor regimes," "pre-transitional regimes," and "abusive regimes."
25. See Josd Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former
Governments: PrinciplesApplicable and Political Constraints, in 1 Transitional Justice 3,
13 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
26. See Goldhagen, supranote 17, at 164-78.
27. See id.
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perpetrated by erstwhile spouses, friends, and neighbors. 28 These acts and
events themselves are girded and sustained by pervasive public sentiments
that provide support for abuses. 29 Members of the international community
frequently fail to intervene. 30 Corporate interests profit from abusive
regimes and the victimization of subjugated groups. 3 1 In some cases
victims are complicit in the abuse of others. 32 When it is time to assign
33
responsibility, tens of thousands have a share.
Despite the incredible demands for justice, transitional governments face
34
severe limitations on their capacity to carry out criminal prosecutions.
One of the most significant limitations is the restricted availability of
professional and bureaucratic resources. 35 There simply are not enough
judges, prosecutors, police, and other officials to meet demands and provide
adequate due process. 36 Ad hoc and permanent international tribunals that
attempt to provide additional resources have proven woefully slow and
37
incapable of making an appreciable dent in the demand.
28. This was true in Rwanda, see Gourevitch, supra note 17, and in Macedonia. See
Julius Strauss & Christian Jennings, Spectre of Ethnic Cleansing Resurrected, Daily
Telegraph (London), June 27, 2001, at 13.
29. See Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 27-163, 416-54; Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 4762, 96-131; Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 33-64
(2000); Jaime Malamud-Goti, Game Without End: State Terror and the Politics of Justice,
29-99 (1996); Carlos S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial 41-60 (1996); Samantha Power, "A
Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (2002); Rorty, supra note 17, at
112-15.
30. Power, supra note 29, at 37 (quoting the suicide note of Jewish activist Szmul
Zygielbojm).
31. The alleged complicity of Exxon-Mobil in abuses perpetrated along its Indonesian
oil pipeline provides a recent example. See Indonesia-Oil and Mining Projects Threaten
Communities
in
Aceh
and
Papua,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/business/environment/indonesia.html
(providing background)
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006). Corporate profiteering from Nazi crimes was also notorious.
Justice has been sought and awarded from some of these entities. See generally John Authers
& Richard Wolffe, The Victim's Fortune: Inside the Epic Battle over the Debts of the
Holocaust (2002); Madeline Doms, Compensationfor Survivors of Slave and ForcedLabor:
The Swiss Bank Settlement and the German FoundationProvide Options for Recovery for
Holocaust Survivors, 14 Transnat'l Law. 171 (2001); International Labor Rights Fund,
http://www.laborrights.org/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2006) (documenting federal litigation
against Exxon brought by the International Labor Rights Fund on behalf of Aceh victims).
32. Alex Boraine, A Country Unmasked:
Inside South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission 128 (2000); Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in
South Africa 2-8 (Alex Boraine et al. eds., 1994) (remarks of Aryeh Neier); Elster, supra
note 21, at 152-53.
33. See Huntington, supra note 1, at 214 (quoting Vaclav Havel, New Year's Address, 3
Uncaptive Minds, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 2); Malamud-Goti, supranote 30, at 22-26.
34. Elster, supra note 21, at 208-11; Schauer, supra note 19, at 270-73.
35. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 777-79.
36. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After
Genocide and Mass Violence 45 (1998).
37. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), for example, has been in
operation for over ten years but, as of this writing, has tried to judgment only twenty-two
cases. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://65.18.216.88/default.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2006). This does not constitute a strong objection to the existence of these
tribunals, whose most important contributions are to international criminal jurisprudence.
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Transitions also must face the reality that many of those who could carry
out criminal trials are tainted by the past. 38 If these officials are forced to
step down there are even fewer prosecutors, judges, clerks, jailers,
39
investigators, and defense attorneys available to conduct prosecutions.
But if tainted officials are left in place transitions must be concerned that
former agents of abuse cannot be relied upon to blame their cohorts, much
less themselves. 40 Thus, beyond straightforward supply issues, transitions
face questions about quality and potential conflicts of interest that
41
compromise their ability to prosecute.
Transitions also have limited material resources. 4 2 Economic reform,
infrastructure, democratization, social programs, and myriad other needs
make claims that exceed the resources of a new nation. 4 3 More often than
not these needs far outstrip the resources of a new nation even without
competition from criminal prosecutions. 44 In addition, transitional regimes
have a limited fund of moral capital and public support. 45 The citizenry of
46
a new state is seldom uniform in its support of a transitional regime.
47
Many will be concerned about the direction taken in transition.
There
also may be significant skepticism about the moral standing of those
charged with carrying out transitional programs. 4 8 Finally, a people
exhausted by years of oppression and revolution may not have the energy to
sustain long public prosecutions, particularly if it means delaying other
transitional projects. 49 In this narrow window of opportunity transitions
must consider where and how to spend precious resources. Efforts to
address past wrongs should not be pursued at the expense of other
50
transitional goals if the trade-off threatens the success of transition itself.
These numbers are meant only to emphasize the impossibility of prosecuting, with full
protection of process, all those implicated in pre-transitional abuses.
38. Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity 89
(2001); Luc Huyse, Justice After Transitions: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in

Dealing with the Past, in 1 Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 104, 109; Schauer, supra
note 19, at 270-72.
39. Stanley A. Roberts, Note, Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction in
Post-SaddamIraq, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 367, 389-90 (2004).
40. See id. at 388-89.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Ackerman, supranote 6, at 72, 74-75.
Id.
See Zalaquett, supra note 25, at 20.
Elster, supra note 21, at 208-15.
See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 72; David Pion-Berlin, To Prosecute or to Pardon?:

Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone, in 1 Transitional Justice,

supra note 25, at 82, 82-83.
46. See Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of DemocraticRegimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and

Reequilibration,in 1 Transitional Justice, supranote 25, at 123, 127-28.
47. Id.
48. Cf Ackerman, supra note 6, at 72 (pointing out that bureaucratic officials upon
whom the success of reforms may depend may be suspect in light of their connections to the
old regime).
49. See id. at 69-81 (discussing the practical and political limitations on efforts to seek
corrective justice in transitions).
50. De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81.

2006]

AN EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH

2627

The practical limitations on justice in transitions translate into a number
of theoretical problems. First, procedural justice, a necessary corollary of
the rule of law, frequently is compromised. 5 1 In transitional circumstances
opportunities for vengeance abound and extrajudicial punishment, including
execution, is common, 52 particularly when justice is left in the hands of
those without professional training or political accountability. 53 Due
process rights are threatened as those arrested wait to be charged, wait for
assistance of counsel, and wait (for years) to get their day in court. 54 Such
results threaten the moral and political standing of transitions by
compromising commitments to the rule of law.
Second, equal distribution of justice is compromised. Because not every
individual implicated in past abuses can be tried all prosecutions will be
selective. 55 If necessity drives the selections it is unlikely that choices will
be made on principle.5 6 Ad hoc distinctions and novel post facto rules
breach transitional commitments to democracy and the rule of law57 while
simultaneously threatening to put the new regime in the same moral
position as its predecessor. 58 The results of these selections are also
frequently counterintuitive. Underlings are tried and punished while highlevel leaders escape prosecution, often by exploiting the fruits of their
abuses. 59 Thus, limitations on resources result in both too many and too
few being punished, and, of those who are punished, their punishment is
often either too severe or not severe enough.
Third, if criminal punishment is the standard then justice will not be
served in transitions. Transitions cannot prosecute all wrongdoers. 60 As a
result many if not most of the guilty will escape punishment, including
many of those most responsible. 6 1 This circumstantial parsimony implies
that those who are not prosecuted are innocent of any wrongdoing and that
62
their victims have suffered no wrong.
51. Elster, supra note 21, at 88, 235-40 (discussing the tension between procedural and
substantive justice and recommending ways to solve the dilemma).
52. Id. at 97-99.
53. Id.
54. This is even true in the "more ideal" circumstances of the ad hoc criminal tribunals.
See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-19, Decision of the Appeals Chamber
(Nov. 3, 1999) (releasing defendant for speedy trial violations).
55. Elster, supra note 21, at 208-15; Hayner, supra note 38, at 12; Minow, supra note
36, at 31, 40-47 , Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-27; van Zyl, supra note 5, at
666.
56. Minow, supra note 36, at 31, 40-44.
57. Martin P. Golding, Retroactive Legislation and Restoration of the Rule of Law, I
Ann. Rev. L. & Ethics 169, 170-74 (1993); see also Elster, supra note 21, at 83, 235-40.
58. Elster, supra note 21, at 83; see Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39, 248-49
(1969) (describing this concern and giving it voice in the context of the parable of the Purple
Shirts).
59. James Cockayne,

The Fraying Shoestring:

Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes

Tribunals, 28 Fordham Int'l L.J. 616, 641-42 (2005).
60. Aukerman, supra note 4, at 51-53.
61. De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81-82; Kiss, supra note 23, at 68.
62. Pablo De Greiff, Trial and Punishment: Pardon and Oblivion, Phil. & Soc. Crit.,

May 1996, at 93, 105.
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Finally, selective prosecutions address only some wrongs, some
wrongdoers, and some victims. They fail to establish a complete and
publicly legitimate account of the past. 63 This failure denies justice to
victims whose suffering is never made part of the record. 64 Moreover, the
nature of the truth established in a criminal trial is limited by the purposes
of the trial-to establish the guilt or innocence of particular individuals
charged with particular acts-as well as by rules of evidence and other
formalities. 65 This limited truth 66 opens the door for revisionism and
potential backlash by failing to meet the transitional
need for a full,
67
historical, and politically legitimate account of the past.
The justice gap that opens in transitions is filled most frequently with
alternative theories of justice, such as restorative justice, 68 and alternative
procedures, such as truth commissions. 69 As products of necessity,
however, these efforts often appear as no more than accommodations that
provide the best justice possible given imperfect circumstances in
transitions. 70 This is deeply dissatisfying for both practitioners and
theorists. A valid and usable theory of transitional justice must take
normative account of these practical concerns, not simply accommodate
them. Given that prosecutions in transitions can never be complete, a
nonideal theory of transitional justice must propose a way to make
prosecutorial selections rational; 7 1 it must provide a morally sustainable
justification for the parsimony implied by selectivity; 72 and it must promise
that transitions can accomplish these goals within the limitations presented
by their circumstances. Rationalizing transitional justice programs as the
73
best justice possible is inadequate.
This Article argues for a transitional justice program centered on
prosecutorial selections made according to an affirmative defense based on
63. See 1 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, ch. 1, 7, 24,
ch. 5, 71, 73 (1999).
64. See Minow, supra note 14, at 235; Rotberg, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing the role of
truth commissions in coming to terms with brutal pasts).
65. Hayner, supra note 38, at 100-02; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18 at 40-41.
66. Minow, supra note 36, at 47, 60.
67. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 658-61, 667.
68. The concept of "restorative" justice is a topic of significant discussion in the
literature on transitional justice. See, e.g. Kiss, supra note 23, at 68-93; Llewellyn, supra
note 23, at 103-07. Restorative justice has also increasingly become a topic of interest for
stable state theorists. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for
Restorative Justice in the United States, 1 Utah L. Rev. 413 (2003). This literature builds on
earlier work done on rehabilitative and educative justice more generally. See, e.g., Jean
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 208 (1984).
69. Author Priscilla B. Hayner provided the first survey of contemporary truth
commissions in Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 Hum.
Rts. Q. 597 (1994). She expanded and deepened her study in Unspeakable Truths:
Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (2001).
70. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 25-26.
71. De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81-82.
72. See id.
73. Posner and Vermeule argue the contrary. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at
825.
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the legality principle. This excuse-centered approach offers a rational
justification for exercising selectivity in transitions and provides guidance
and justification for other features of transitional justice programs.
II. THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRACTICAL CONCERNS

Treating broad complicity as a practical limitation on trials in transitions
begs a critical question confronting transitional movements: How could so
many join to perpetrate atrocities? This part contends that mass atrocities
are in part a function of social and legal norms. Absent a socio-legal
environment that supports abuse, abuses on the scale confronted by
transitions would not occur. Thus, it is argued, most of those who
participated in pre-transitional abuses should be excused from prosecution.
A. The Role of an Abusive Public Face of Law in Abusive Regimes
Who doubts that the Argentine or Chilean murderers of people who
opposed the recent authoritarian regimes thought that their victims
deserved to die? Who doubts that the Tutsis who slaughtered Hutus in
Burundi or the Hutus who slaughtered Tutsis in Rwanda, that one
Lebanese militia which slaughtered the civilian supporters of another, that
the Serbs who have killed Croats or Bosnian Muslims, did so out of
actions? Why do we not believe the
conviction in the justice of their 74
same for the German perpetrators?
-Daniel Goldhagen
75
Genocide, after all, is an exercise in community building.

-Philip Gourevitch
Mass atrocities on a scale necessitating programs of transitional justice
are not phenomena of happenstance in which thousands of agents
independently and simultaneously decide to murder their neighbors. 76 The
scale, breadth, and duration of these abuses demonstrate that there is
something distinctive about the targeted violence committed by and under
abusive regimes. 77 Particularly salient is the role played by law, social
norms, and publicly circulated, officially sanctioned, beliefs, 78 collectively
79
"the public face of law."

74. Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 14-15.
75. Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 95.
76. See Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 15-16 (noting that perpetrators were working in
prescribed roles).
77. See van Zyl, supra note 5, at 661-62.
78. These include a social ontology and a historical teleology. See, e.g., Goldhagen,
supra note 17, at 27-163; Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 47-62, 96-131; Malamud-Goti, supra
note 29, at 71-99; Nino, supra note 29, at 41-60; Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-15. Social
ontologies are normalized typologies in which individuals are typed and situated
hierarchically. Teleologies provide abusive regimes with an account of the current conflict
in a broader historical context. Referring to this background, abusive regimes solve current
disorder by devising and executing strategies designed to make the real world better
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When examining the Nazi Holocaust or any number of genocides before
and since it is tempting to think that only evil, irrational, or savage people
could perpetrate horrific acts on such a terrible scale. 80 Normal people,
people like us, could never do what they did-at least not willingly. 81 This
intuition, while comforting, obscures an essential feature of mass violence:
The greatest of evils is perpetrated not by devils 82 but by and with the
support of average citizens. 83 Genocide and other mass atrocities simply
could not occur without the participation and aid of "willing
84
executioners."
Many of those implicated in mass violence were not so willing, of
course. 85 Duress is a frequent tool of abusive regimes, 86 and those faced
with a kill or be killed ultimatum cannot, by definition, be described as
willing. 87 Those manipulated by combinations of drugs, brainwashing, and
threats (including the child soldiers 88 who have been implicated in abuses
committed in Sierra Leone, 89 Liberia, 9 0 the Ivory Coast, Uganda, 9 1 Congo,
and Columbia 92) also do not fit neatly into the category of willing
executioners. 93 In all abusive regimes there also are those who actively
oppose, protest, and work to prevent atrocities. 94 Abusive regimes are, in
short, far from homogenous. Even taking into account these complexities,
it remains the case that institutionalized atrocities require the support of
approximate their ideal end of history. This "final solution" often means eliminating entirely
the target group.
79. Teitel, supra note 16, at 18-20.
80. Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-15.
81. Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 14.
82. I use this word conscious of, but distinct from, its Kantian meaning. See Immanuel
Kant, Perpetual Peace 24-32 (Lewis White Beck ed., Liberal Arts Press 1957) (1795). My
argument in this Article centers on the proposition that mass atrocities are perpetrated by
members of the human race, Immanuel Kant's "race of devils," who, having failed to bind
their actions to the demands of moral right, are subjects of law. I, however, do not propose
to forgive the moral lapses of pre-transitional abusers any more than Kant forgives those
who fail to do their moral duty. Devils are devils still, no matter the ineffectiveness of a
devil's solution.
83. See Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 164-65; Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 115; see also
Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-15.
84. I take this phrase from author Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, supra note 17.
85. See Minow, supra note 36, at 35-36.
86. Id; see Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 96, 249.
87. Matthew Happold, Excluding Childrenfrom Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and
Article IFofthe Refugee Convention, 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1131, 1162-63 (2002).
88. See generally Rachel Brett & Margaret McCallin, Children: The Invisible Soldiers
(2d ed. 1998).
89. Norimitsu Onishi, Children of War in Sierra Leone Try to Start Over, N.Y. Times,
May 9, 2002, at A14.
90. Human Rights Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill: Child Soldiers in Liberia (2004),
availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/liberia0204.
91. Human Rights Watch, Stolen Children: Abduction and Recruitment in Northern
Uganda (2003), availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303.
92. Human Rights Watch, "You'll Learn Not to Cry": Child Combatants in Colombia
(2003), availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903.
93. Happold, supra note 87, at 1138, 1158-65.
94. Elster, supra note 21, at 99.
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participants, passive supporters, opportunistic profiteers, and those who
indulge in naive denial. 95 While we may applaud the heroes we are left to
wonder how so many were led to such madness. Answering this question
requires taking seriously the possibility that the practical realities of scale
and complicity that distinguish abusive regimes are not merely differences
in magnitude, as compared to the everyday problems that face "ordinary
justice," 96 but rather serve as markers for unique social conditions that carry
normative force, making it impossible to simply dismiss transitional justice
as a special case of everyday justice.
In stable states there is a close identification between norms and the
norm. 9 7 Wrongs, as crimes, are the exception, perpetrated in violation of
established and regularly enforced legal codes. By contrast, in abusive
regimes targeted abuse is the norm. 9 8 Widespread abuses are institutional
tools of pre-transitional states. 99 In ancign regimes, black-letter law
frequently fails to condemn, and instead supports or even demands acts of
abuse.100 Executive and judicial agents participate in these activities, either
directly or by sustaining an environment in which murder and other abuses
can flourish.' 0 ' Police and the military join local officials in organizing and
perpetrating offenses in the name of the state.10 2 Other public personalities
organize programs of systematic discrimination. 10 3 These official acts form

95. Frau Maria, mother of the repentant soldier in author Simon Wiesenthal's famous
essay "The Sunflower," is the paradigmatic example for this class. Simon Wiesenthal, The
Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness 84-94 (1997).
96. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 777-825 (suggesting that the distinctive
dilemmas of transitional justice are overblown versions of ordinary legal problems).
97. Van Zyl, supra note 5,at 661.
98. Cf id.at 660-61 (describing the prevalence and legality of political killings in
Apartheid South Africa).
99. See Rajeev Bhargava, Restoring Decency to BarbaricSocieties, in Truth v. Justice:
The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 45, 45-50. This "symmetric barbarity"
is what Professor Rajeev Bhargava contends distinguishes pre-transitional regimes that are
appropriate subjects of transitional justice from programs of abuse carried out by a few
perpetrators without the popular knowledge or support of society and social institutions. See
id.
100. See Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 96, 123 (describing how killing Tutsis was
effectively the law in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide); see Nunca Mds: The Report of the
Argentina National Commission on the Disappeared 442 pt. V (1984), available at
http://www.nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain 001.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2006) [hereinafter Nunca Mds: Part V] (providing extensive documentation of the role
played by the fight against communism in the minds, policies, and actions of those who
fought in Argentina's "Dirty War"); see also Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European
Jews 62-63 (1961) (discussing the compulsory boycott of Jewish-owned businesses in Nazi
Germany).
101. The Nazi regime presents, perhaps, the most pernicious example of official
participation in abuse. See, e.g., Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans 7 (1966);
Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 97; Simon Wiesenthal, Every Day Remembrance Day 11-28
(1987). But some level of public support is a ubiquitous and necessary condition of the mass
violence that precedes transitional movements, presenting the need for systemic reform.
102. Alan S. Rosenbaum, Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals 11-12 (1993).
103. Hilberg, supra note 100, at 4-6 (describing how canonical law affected Jews in Italy
during the Holocaust).
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part of a public face of law that provides license for the events that cry out
for justice in transition. In recognition of the role played by the public face
of law in abusive regimes, transitions count among their highest goals
sponsoring personal and institutional reforms committed to democratic
104
ideals, human rights, and the rule of law.
Composed of these elements the public face of law is not the same as
black-letter law. In some regimes black-letter law requires abuse. This is
not always the case, however. In many regimes laws on the books prohibit
murder, rape, and other acts of violence. 10 5 Unfortunately, "in transitional
periods, there is commonly a large gap between the law as written and as it
is perceived."' 0 6 This perception gap, which reflects the reality of what law
is in abusive regimes, is regulated by social and institutional elements of the
public face of law, which affect perceptions of what is and is not
prohibited,' 0 7 and, perhaps more importantly, who is and who is not
deserving of legal protection. 10 8 So, while there were laws on the books
against assault and murder in antebellum slave states, they did not provide
effective protection for slaves, who were considered chattel. 10 9 Similarly,
in abusive regimes the targeting of certain classes of victims is sanctioned
by prevailing beliefs regarding who is and who is not included in the class
of beings who enjoy the protections afforded by laws against murder, rape,
and assault.
Mass atrocities are not a coincidental collection of independent acts.
Large-scale abuses happen for a reason. 1 0 In pre-transitional regimes, the
institutions that organize abuse reflect a deeper social ethos, a historical
ontology, and a narrative truth that present abusive practices as rational or,
in some cases, necessary."I I The Nazi Holocaust provides a stark example.

104. See Elster, supra note 21, at 83; Teitel, supra note 16, at 29.
105. Sanford Levinson, Trials, Commissions, and Investigating Committees: The Elusive
Searchfor Norms of Due Process, in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions,

supranote 9, at 211, 219.
106. Teitel, supra note 16, at 19.
107. Id. at 18-20.
108. Abusive regimes frequently justify abuses by reclassifying victims such that they
cannot be "murdered" or "raped." See Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-14.
109. See Omar Swartz, Codifying the Law of Slavery in North Carolina: Positive Law
and the Slave Persona, 29 T. Marshall L. Rev. 285, 291-300 (2004) (discussing failed
prosecutions of slave owners for assault and murder). The same cannot be said of lynch
mobs in the American South during the 1920s. As is emphasized in Parts III and IV of this
Article, there is no excuse for those who cling to social beliefs rejected in transition. The
Reconstruction Amendments, in combination with federal criminal codes, made clear to all
Americans the inherent evil of the social ontology that categorized those of African and
Caribbean heritage as chattel rather than citizens deserving of full legal protection.
110. Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 180 (listing the factors that led to genocide in
Rwanda). The point that atrocities happen for a reason should not be confused with cultural
or social determinism. Certain social conditions are necessary for mass atrocities. Social
mores are incapable of acting alone, however, and just as individual choices and actions are
necessary to produce atrocities so are individual moral failures. See Goldhagen, supra note
17, at 20-22. As I argue below, these moral failures cannot be subject to legal punishment.
111. Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 3-24, 49-50; Wiesenthal, supra note 101, at 15.
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Nazi crimes, and the support provided by ordinary Germans during the
Holocaust, were sponsored by an "eliminationist anti-Semitism"'1 12 that
foretold a complete eradication of European Jews. 1 3 Public norms and an
officially sanctioned public face of law, disseminated and enforced by
bureaucratic, executive, and military agents, played a critical role in the
targeting of Jews and Gypsies for death in Nazi-occupied Europe from 1935
to 1945.114 From the first experiments with violence preceding the passage
of the Nuremberg Laws to Kristallnacht to the full-scale mechanized
murders perpetrated in concentration camps, the Nazi's killing of Jews was
15
consistent with a publicly circulated view that Jews must be eliminated.'
The Nazis are not alone in drawing on historical teleology and social
ontology to guide and justify mass atrocity. 116 Philosopher Richard Rorty
points out that a dehumanizing ontology, in combination with a historical
ontology, was at the center of atrocities perpetrated in Bosnia, where
abusers did not see themselves as committing offenses because they did not
view their victims as humans. 1 7 In a chilling account of the Rwandan
massacre, Philip Gourevitch explains that the bodies washing up on the
shores of Lake Kivu and Lake Victoria were sent to Ethiopia at the
direction of Hutu authorities as an expression of a historical ontology in
which tall and light-skinned Tutsis were aggressors from the north to be
sent back on the waters that had brought them. 1 18 Asserted differences in
race and biology are frequent sources for abusive ontologies. 119 An abuse
sustaining truth can also be more obviously political, as was the case in
Argentina, where the Dirty War on communism allowed state agents to

112. Goldhagen, supranote 17, at 49-128.
113. Rosenbaum, supranote 102, at 11 ("A review of some of the fateful occurrences that
eventuated in the Nazi 'Final Solution to the Jewish Question' will demonstrate that the
exterminative activities were the outcome of, among other factors, a virulent antisemitism.");
Wiesenthal, supra note 101, at 15. See generally Jeremy Cohen, The Friars and the Jews:
The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism (1982); Joshua Trachtenberg, The Devil and the
Jews: The Medieval Conception of the Jew and Its Relation to Modem Anti-Semitism
(Jewish Publication Soc'y 1983) (1943).
114. See Davidson, supra note 101, at 7; Wiesenthal, supra note 101, at 11-28.
115. Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 8, 11-13, 416-54; Rosenbaum, supra note 102, at 1116.
116. To provide a rough description of the landscape, Nazi Germany, the Rwandan
genocide, Argentina during the 1960s and 1970s, the antebellum American South, and
Apartheid South Africa all provide examples of cases in which an abusive public face of law
is sufficiently central that an excuse may be appropriate. Abuses perpetrated in the
American South after Reconstruction, the massacre at My Lai, and abuses at Abu Ghraib
would not.
117. Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-16.
118. Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 47-62; see also Colette Braeckman, Incitement to
Genocide, in Crimes of War 192 (Roy Gutmann & David Rieff, eds., 1999); Human Rights
Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda.
119. See Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 66-69; Richard M. Lerner, Final Solutions:
Biology, Prejudice, and Genocide (1992); Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest
Hatred (1991).
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torture, disappear, and murder thousands of Argentines; 120 or even
consciously constructed, as historian John W. Dower documents with
respect to war crimes perpetrated in the Pacific theater during World War
11.121

In some cases state approval is tacit, manifested by passivity in the face
of abuses. 122 In others state support is active and organized. 12 3 In some
instances laws against murder are not enforced or are interpreted as not
protecting certain groups. 124 In still others black-letter law or official state
policies require murder. 12 5 In all cases, however, state support expressed as
an abusive public face of law is a necessary corollary of mass atrocity. To
conclude the contrary would be to claim that the Holocaust, the Argentine
Dirty War, the abuses of Apartheid, and the Rwandan Massacre were no
more than unhappy coincidences of independent criminal action.
Calls for transition and the institutional and social reforms that transitions
entail serve as further evidence of the above descriptive claim. While acts
of violence stand out against the backdrop of a stable state, the acts that
characterize pre-transitional societies blend into a society whose pathology
runs so deep that massive political, social, cultural, and legal change is
necessary. 126 The requirement for reform only makes sense if one
27
recognizes that there is something deeply wrong with abusive regimes. 1
An abusive public face of law is both evidence of what is wrong and,
as
28
expressed and advanced through public institutions, a tool of atrocity. 1
It does not, for the moment, matter where the "truth" that underlies and
sustains abusive regimes comes from. Whether it is a result of colonial
120. Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 71-145; Nino, supra note 29, at 44-50; Alexandre
de S.C. Barros & Edmundo C. Coelho, Military Intervention and Withdrawal in South
America, in Armies & Politics in Latin America 437-43 (Abraham F. Lowenthal & J.
Samuel Fitch eds., 1986); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Military Coups:
Theory, Comparisons, and the Argentine Case, in Armies & Politics in Latin America,
supra, at 96; Nunca Mds: Part V, supra note 100.

121. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (1986).
122. The most notorious contemporary examples of tacit government approval of abuses
come from Colombia. See Noam Chomsky, Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World
Affairs 62 (2000).
123. See, e.g., Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 85-96 (noting papers and periodicals
supporting the genocide).

124. Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 97-98; Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-15; Teitel, supra
note 16, at 18-20.
125. E.g., Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 96 ("The law.., mandated death to
'accomplices' of the 'cockroaches' [the Tutsis] .... ").
126. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 661 (pointing out that criminal justice is more appropriate
for stable states where abuses are the exception rather than the norm).
127. Ackerman, supranote 6, at 5.
128. I allude, here, to philosopher Michel Foucault's famous "Regime of Truth." Michel
Foucault, Truth andPower,in The Foucault Reader 74 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984). While the
transitional justice literature does not yet include a rigorous ethnography of abusive regimes,
the literature is rife with monographs documenting the intricate interplay of truth,
institutions, and practices of power in the genesis of atrocities. See, e.g., Mark Danner, The
Massacre at El Mozote (1993); Goldhagen, supra note 17; Gourevitch, supra note 17;
Malamud-Goti, supra note 29; Nino, supra note 29; Power, supra note 29.
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involvement, political strategy, or timeless narrative, the effect is the same:
There is a rational social grounding for pre-transitional abuses. 129 This
socio-ontological support combines with actual laws on the books, official
doctrine, and state practice to construct an abusive public face of law that
affects interpretations of legal duty in abusive states and establishes the
conditions necessary for mass atrocities 30on a scale that then requires
systemic transition and transitional justice. 1
The public face of law in abusive regimes and the role it plays in
individual actions highlights a critical difference between normal criminal
activity and abuses committed by and under abusive regimes without
obscuring the importance of heterogeneity in pre-transitional states. Those
who participate in mass violence choose to become abusers, some
grudgingly and some with frightening enthusiasm. The critical point
defended in this Article is that these choices are not made in solipsistic
isolation.
Abusive regimes are "burdened" societies. 13 1 Atrocities
committed by and under abusive regimes reflect an operating set of socially
generated and publicly circulated beliefs that, in combination with
institutional practices and government policies, form a public face of law
that at least does not forbid violence against a victim group, and often
actively encourages it.
This claim does not defend or rely on cultural determinism. 132 Those
living under abusive regimes can choose not to participate in atrocities, as
evidenced by those who oppose abusive regimes from within, often at great
peril. It also does not imply that conformance to an abusive public face of
law justifies abuse. Rape, murder, and torture are evils no matter what the
law says. 133 The only claim that need be made is that the public face of
law, as it appears to those living under an abusive regime, does not forbid,
and frequently encourages, human rights violations directed against
particular individuals and groups. 134 This official support distinguishes
institutionalized mass violence from banal criminal activity or small-scale

129.
130.
131.
132.

Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 14-15.
Elster, supra note 21, at 83; Teitel, supra note 16, at 29.
Rawls, supra note 20, at 5, 106-13.
Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1293 (1986);

Julia P. Sams, Note, The Availability of the "Cultural Defense" as an Excuse for Criminal

Behavior, 16 Ga. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 335 (1986); Malek-Mithra Sheybani, Comment,
CulturalDefense: One Person's Culture Is Another's Crime, 9 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

751 (1987). The defense is not particularly new, however. See Rex v. Esop, (1836) 173 Eng.
Rep. 203.
133. Ronald Dworkin, Internal Realism (Aug. 15, 2001) (unpublished manuscript),
available

at

http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program200l/readings/reading2/internalrealism.pdf
[hereinafter Dworkin, Internal Realism]; see also Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth:
You'd Better Believe It, 25 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 87 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity and
Truth].

134. Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 14-15, 80-163; Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 96, 110131.
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conditions

B. The Normative Significance of an Abusive Public Face of Law
That past wrongs enjoyed official and social approval presents significant
deontological and consequentialist challenges to criminal trials in
transitions to democracy. 36 Transitional movements count among their
highest commitments dedication to the rule of law. 13 7 The rule of law,
which shapes the call for trials in transitions, retains a strong commitment
138
to the principle of non malum sine lege, or the legality principle.
Whether rendered as non malum sine lege or a prohibition against ex post
facto 139 enforcement of law, the principle of legality prohibits states from
punishing acts that were not against the law at the time they were
committed.
140
The problem of legality is at the center of transitional justice debates.
The Constitutional Court of Hungary met the issue in its review of a law
allowing prosecutions of those responsible for the suppression of the 1956
uprising.' 4 1 The law repealed statutes of limitation and criminalized
activities that were encouraged under the predecessor regime. When called
to rule on the constitutionality of the new law, the equally new
Constitutional Court recognized a "paradox of the revolution of the rule of
law"' 142 and found itself forced to decide between "the principle of
predictability and foreseeability" which grounds the "criminal law's
prohibition of the use of retroactive legislation," and the rule of law
understood as substantive justice.14 3 For the court, the paradox was a result
of a situational division between the rule of law as an agent of right and the
135. Bhargava, supra note 99, at 45-50.
136. Aukerman, supra note 4, at 59, 75.
137. Elster, supra note 21, at 83, 235-40; Minow, supra note 36, at 25, 30-37; Golding,
supra note 57, at 170-74.
138. See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 70-74 (1991); Fuller, supra note

58, at 39, 248-49; Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 27-69 (2d ed. 1960);
Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 79-87 (1968); see also William
Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *45-47; Lon L. Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law-A Reply
to ProfessorHart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 650-51 (1958).

139. The United States Constitution establishes the principal in these terms. See U.S.
Const. art. I, §§ 9-10.
140. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 74; Elster, supra note 21, at 235-40; Fuller, supra note
58, at 245-53; Teitel, supra note 16, at 11-26, 33-36; Aukerman, supra note 4, at 75; David
A. Crocker, Truth Commissions, TransitionalJustice, and Civil Society, in Truth v. Justice:

The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 99, 105-06. Contemporary discussions
of legality in the context of transitional justice owe a debt to Professors H.L.A. Hart and Lon
Fuller and their series of articles in the Harvard Law Journal known as the Hart-Fuller
debate. Fuller, supra note 138, at 648-6 1; H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law
and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 615-24 (1958).
141. Judgment of March 3, 1992, [Constitutional Court] MK. No. 11/1992 (Hung.),

translatedin 1 J.Const. L. in E. & Cent. Eur. 129 (1994).
142. Id. at 138 (internal quotation omitted).
143. Id.at 141.
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rule of law as a regulative ideal. In the end, the court decided that the
revolutionary role of law as an agent of change could not trump the
principles of predictability internal to the rule of law. 144
German courts faced an almost identical issue in the border-guards
cases. 145 The guards accused of shooting East Germans fleeing across the
border claimed that they were executing a legal duty. 146 The courts were
asked to decide to what extent the law of the previous regime provided a
defense. Recognizing that laws, such as those under which the border
guards acted, may be formally valid but not substantively right, the
Germans allowed the prosecutions to proceed. 14 7 In terms of the dilemma
posed by the principle of legality they chose the transformative potential of
the law over its formal duties of predictability and fair warning.
These are but two examples. Because of the critical role played by the
public face of law in abusive regimes, all transitions confront legality. That
courts have come to different conclusions emphasizes the difficulty of the
issues.
1. The Legality Principle as an Excusing Condition for Most Implicated in
Pre-transitional Abuses
Given that mass atrocities enjoy state support and comport with the
prevailing public face of law, broad criminal prosecutions in transitions
would violate the principle of legality with respect to most persons who
may be targets for prosecution. Taking account of legality in transitions
does not require forgoing all prosecutions, however. Rather, a proper
14 8
accounting of legality concerns results in vertically limited prosecutions
that focus on high-level leaders who are directly exposed to the demands of
international laws against genocide' 4 9 and crimes against humanity, 150 each
of which can provide grounds for individual criminal liability. 151
144. Id. at 152-54; accord Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, No.
2086/A/1991/14, in 3 Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 629, 635-36; see also Ldszl6
S6lyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian
Constitutional Court 19 (2000).
145. Berlin State Court, No. (523) 2 is 48/90 (9/91), in 3 Transitional Justice, supra note
25, at 576.
146. Id.; Teitel, supra note 16, at 16.
147. Berlin State Court,No. (523) 2 is 48/90 (9/91), supra note 145, at 576; Teitel, supra
note 16, at 16-17.
148. I am in debt to author Paul van Zyl for this terminology.
149. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
For an
exhaustive account of the Convention, its genesis, application, and challenges, see generally
William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2000). The
Convention has a colored and complicated history internationally and in the United States.
For an engaging account, see Power, supra note 29, at 46-169.
150. Crimes against humanity first became a critical tool of international law practice
after World War II as part of the Nuremberg Charter. Charter of the International Military
Tribunal art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288. The most
current iteration of crimes against humanity in international law is found in the statute,
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For an act to be a crime it must be a transgression of law-nullum crimen
sine lege.15 2 The principle of legality in criminal jurisprudence centers on
two concerns. First, the fair and legitimate use of the police power of the
state is predicated on an obligation of fair warning-nulla poena sine
lege. 153 Citizens must have a reasonable chance to know the law so that
they will know which acts will be punished and which will not.1 54 This156
is
155 and one of clarity.
really two requirements, one of formal warning
15 7
Black-letter law and consistent state action satisfy the first requirement.
158
Lucidity, publicity, and regular enforcement satisfy the second.
Excessively vague laws provide little or no guidance and are
unenforceable. 159
The second concern that motivates the principle of legality centers on
those charged with enforcing the law. Two key principles of fairness in the
enforcement of law are predictability and consistency. 160 Black-letter law
provides enforcement officials with basic guidelines needed to regulate
social behavior. Clear law guards against "discriminatory and arbitrary
enforcement.' 161 Without law, police agents may act on their own
impulses, and enforcement of social mores may become arbitrary and

known as the Rome Statute, establishing the International Criminal Court. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
151. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment
(May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment (May 7, 1997); 4 Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.
10, at 2 (United States v. Ohlendorf et al. (The Einsatzgruppen Trial) (1948)).
152. The legality principle is widely viewed as a central tenet of "the rule of law." See
A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 102-21 (1982); Fuller,
supra note 58, at 51-65, 245-53; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 238 (1971). For a more
detailed account of how this principle is an essential feature of the rule of law in new
democracies, see Golding, supra note 57, at 170-74. The constitutional rule against
retrospective enforcement, the core of the legality requirement, is set out in Article I,
Sections 9-10, of the United States Constitution: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law
shall be passed."
153. Fuller, supra note 58, at 58-59; Hall, supra note 138, at 27-64.
154. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977).
155. The requirement for some form of law is central to both Roman and common law
traditions. See Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220 (H.L. 1961) (U.K.);
A.T. Denning, Freedom Under the Law 40-42 (1949). Shaw has met with some dispute in
the academic community. See H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 7-12 (1963). These
objections, however, do not go to the central rule forwarded in Shaw, namely that judges
may not create offenses for individuals out of vague commitments to public good.
156. Judgment of the ConstitutionalCourt of Hungary, No. 2086/All991/14, supra note
144, at 629 pmbl., 631 pt. IV(3), (4); Fuller, supra note 58, at 63-65; John Calvin Jeffries,
Jr., Legality, Vagueness and the Constructionof Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189 (1985).
157. Teitel, supra note 16, at 19 ("The validity of prior law depended on the social
practices of the time, such as the norm's publication and transparency.").
158. Packer, supra note 138, at 79-87, 287.
159. Jeffries, supra note 156, at 196.
160. See Hall, supra note 138, at 36-54.
161. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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completely dependent upon the officer, prosecutor, or judge at hand. 162
Law provides a hub around which enforcement activities revolve. The
principle of legality ensures that regulation of social action and the use of
state police power will be rule-bound, consistent, fair, and legitimate. 163
Both of these justifications of the legality principle focus on the role that
the judiciary and the executive play in democratic regimes and under the
rule of law. Judges and courts have the limited duty to apply law. 164 Other
processes of justification propagate law itself.165 As a rule courts may not
66
indulge in legislative behavior. The law that they must apply binds them.1
Without law to apply, courts and police are without moral and legal
power in the absence of legal authority is
authority to act. Exercise of state
67
a hallmark of abusive regimes.1
One might favor a more active role for judges. Indeed, a reason offered
in favor of criminal trials in transitions is that trials can model commitments
to the rule of law while establishing an independent judiciary. 168 The
169
judiciary has proven to be a valuable agent of reform in stable societies.
Given these potentials, it might seem odd to take a strict view of the
70
judiciary's role in transitions when the need for reform is so great. 1
There are two points to be made here. First, the criminal law is not the
best tool in the arsenal of an activist court. Historically, courts favor
activism only to sponsor tort or regulatory reform. 17 1 Where courts do use
the criminal law in a reform capacity, it is usually to add excuses or
justifications rather than create new crimes. This is a reflection of the
162. While the regulative principle of legality plays a key role in states committed to the
rule of law, abusive regimes are defined by their use of state authority to emphasize the
personal power of individuals and the enigmatic power of the regime. See Malamud-Goti,
supra note 29, at 124-39.
163. Jeffries, supra note 156, at 192-93. Notably, this version of "fairness" does not
include a requirement that the law is "right." The premium is on clarity and forewarning.
164. See R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 138 (1986); JOrgen Habermas, Between Facts
and Norms 115, 171-74 (1996).
165. Habermas, supra note 164, at 171-74 (pointing out the centrality of civil society and
legislatures in justifying and propagating laws).
166. The idea that written rules can bind judges is contested. See, e.g., Stanley Fish,
Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and
Legal Studies 87-119, 294-314 (1989); Kenneth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and
Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, in Interpreting Law and
Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 115 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
But see Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (1988); Ronald
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,60 Tex. L. Rev. 527 (1982).
167. See Fuller, supra note 58, at 245-53; Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 124-39.
168. Teitel, supra note 16, at 23-26.
169. Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2417,
2446-56 (2004) (discussing the rise of policy litigation after Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 438 (1954)).
170. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 99-112; Teitel, supra note 16, at 22-26.
171. See generally Daniel Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political
Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity (2000); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions:
The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47 (1977); Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev 509 (1986); Saul
Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, andReparations,99 Colum. L. Rev. 1657 (1999).
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principle of legality. 172 Second, judicial activism does not resolve legality
concerns. Ex post facto laws are no more just coming from judges than
73
from a legislature. 1
The principle of legality, as presented here, might strike some readers as
unique to a positivist conception of the law. 174 Specifically, the principle
may seem to imply that law is limited to black-letter law, without regard to
natural right.' 7 5 Such a perspective begs important questions about the
source and nature of law and ignores a long tradition of scholarship that
argues for a close relationship between morality and law. 176 These
concerns are discussed in later parts of this Article. For now, it will suffice
to raise a few points for consideration.
First, to the extent that the legality principle is positivist, the rule of law
is positivist. This is not as bold a commitment as it may appear. One need
not believe that law and morality are entirely separable 17 7 to believe that
laws on the books play an essential role in the fair and just exercise of legal
force. The rule of law is not the same as the rule of laws, which more aptly
Non-pejorative
describes the pejorative 178 use of "positivism."' 179
positivism simply points out that law and morals are not necessarily
linked. 180 The principle of legality is positivist insofar as it recognizes that
law and morality sometimes diverge. Where this occurs, the principle
contends that punishment cannot be justified based on morality alone, but
must be measured by the external and objective standards of law. 181
Second, these debates are beside the point in the present context. There
may be other ways to conceive of the law without the principle of legality.
Speculation about these other worlds serves little purpose in the present
debate, however, because legality is central to the rule of law as it has
In contrast to their
developed in constitutional democracies. 182
172. Jeffries, supra note 156, at 191-95. This strong attachment to the legality principle
in the criminal context coupled with a willingness to relax the principle in tort law has been
longstanding in the American system. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
173. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (holding unconstitutional a state
court's extension of criminal trespassing law); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:
Federal Courts and the Law 10-14 (1997).
174. Trial ofBorder Guards: Berlin State Court, No. (523) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91), supra note
145, at 576, 578-85.
175. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 180 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed.,
1995).
176. This debate is as old as law itself. Perhaps the best exchange on the topic is found in
the Hart-Fuller debate. Fuller, supra note 138, at 630; Hart, supra note 141, at 593. Hart
concedes that laws in a well-ordered legal regime should coincide with core features of
social morality. Id.at 622-24.
177. Austin, supra note 175, at 136-41.
178. Hart, supra note 141, at 595.
179. Golding, supra note 57, at 171-72.
180. Austin, supra note 175, at 136-41.
181. Hall, supra note 138, at 36-55, 58-64. This position is entirely consistent with the
claim that one has a moral obligation not to obey immoral demands. See Fuller, supra note
138, at 651-56.
182. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev.
321, 331-32 (2002).
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predecessors, faithfulness to legality and the rule of law is a central
aspirational goal of transitions.1 83 In the context of transitions to
democracy, then, rejecting legality would change the face of the movement
entirely, putting the transitional regime at risk of hypocrisy, threatening its
1 84
moral status and its ultimate potential for success.
Third, the principle of legality is not unique to positivist conceptions of
the law. It is a function of other moral and political principles. As Lon
85
Fuller argues, legality is part of the essential internal morality of the law.1
The rules in the rule of law are the minimum standards necessary to achieve
an ordered society. Primary among these is a prohibition against ex post
facto enforcement of criminal law. To ignore this principal in practice
would be to undermine the moral and practical goals of law and legal
practice. Thus, even if a transitional government faces a past regime that
was not legitimate, just, right, or moral, the new state is bound by its own
commitment to the rule of law.' 86 To pursue a course of retroactive
lawmaking would be symptomatic of the exact legal pathology that the new
18 7
state aspires to cure.
Finally, the legality principal is inextricably bound to core democratic
and human rights values of autonomy and concomitant limitations on the
use of state power. The core interest represented by legality is fair
warning. 188 To justify coercion, a violation of autonomy, the law must
provide fair warning. Agents have a right to know beforehand that their
acts are punishable under the law. If there is no law or if the law is too
vague and ambiguous, it is not fair to punish an agent who had no warning
that his actions were punishable. Efforts by courts or police to circumvent
this principle undermine the rule of law, which provides for the ultimate
sovereignty of the law itself, 189 particularly in transitional regimes. 190
The principle of legality comes down to a prohibition on retroactive
enforcement of law. Agents under the law must know that their actions risk
punishment. By definition, abuses in anci~n regimes were not under such a
threat. Thus transitional courts cannot punish pre-transitional bad acts
insofar as they were consistent with the public face of law. To conduct
criminal trials in these conditions would be to violate a foundational
principle of the rule of law.

183. Elster, supra note 21, at 83, 235-36; Golding, supra note 57, at 171-72; see also
Fuller, supra note 58, at 248-49, 252.
184. Fuller, supra note 58, at 248-49.
185. Fuller, supra note 138, at 650-57; see also Fuller, supra note 58, at 39, 248-49.
186. Fuller, supra note 58, at 39, 248-49.
187. Id.; Golding, supra note 57, at 182-87.
188. Fuller, supra note 58, at 58; Golding, supra note 57, at 181-82.
189. Fuller, supra note 58, at 157-62.
190. Golding, supra note 57, at 180 (pointing out the "pathology" of retroactive laws).
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2. The Positive Potential of Legality in Transitions and a Focus on Public
Agency
As is apparent in the foregoing discussion, the legality principle is
concerned centrally with persons in their roles as legal agents. 19 1 This
principle points out that citizens are only subject to legal punishment in
their statuses as legal agents. This is significantly different from the often
similar structures of moral blame inasmuch as the law plays a necessary
role in constructing legal guilt. 192 Moreover, under the legality principle,
legal punishment is grounded in a presumption that those living under the
law take account of law in their decision making. Punishment is reserved
exclusively for acts committed by persons in their public status as legal
agents under the public face of the law.
This is true for both
consequentialist and deontological legal theories.
Accounting for the role played by legality in legal agency and legal
blame has important consequences for transitional justice. Negatively,
taking seriously the role of public agency in constructing legal blame
reaffirms the consequences of legality as an objection to broad criminal
prosecutions in transitions. The principle of legality and the concerns that
93
underlie it justify punishment by assuming that criminals were warned.'
Punishing in the absence of the warning either violates the moral autonomy
of the accused, 194 or it is pointless, 195 or both.
As to the positive consequences, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously argued that law is, by its nature, concerned only with effect, and
not with moral culpability. 196
His fellows and followers calculate
punishment according to equations of deterrence and social cost. 19 7 The
publicly accessible agent is front and center in such theories. Punishment is
rational only inasmuch as it can play a part in the decisions of those living
under the law. As philosopher H.L.A. Hart puts it, law is designed "to
guide individuals' choices as to behaviour by presenting them with reasons
for exercising choice in the direction of obedience."' 198 "Reasons" here go
beyond simple threats. Law also serves an expressive function, publicly

191. James Bohman, Punishment as a Political Obligation: Crimes Against Humanity
and the Enforceable Right to Membership, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 551, 552-53 (2002).
192. Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt 25-26, 57-64 (E.B. Ashton trans.,
Fordham Univ. Press 2000) (1947).
193. See Ashworth, supra note 138, at 86-87.
194. Duff, supra note 164, at 170-72 (pointing out that instrumental goals cannot justify
punishment, as a violation of autonomy, absent a violation of law).
195. Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment 23 (1989).
196. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-60 (1897).
197. 1 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
[hereinafter Introduction], in The Works of Jeremy Bentham 86 (John Bowring ed.,
Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) [hereinafter Works]; 1 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the
Penal Law [hereinafter Principles], in Works, supra, at 365; see Gary Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985).
198. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 44 (1968).
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declaring what is right. 199 In any event, punishing past acts based on novel
shifts in the public face of law is without purpose because the changes do
not, by definition, have an impact on the legal agent in her pre-shift public
mode and punishing based on pre-shift acts does not provide significant
200
comparative benefit over punishment based on post-shift acts.
Taking note of the role of public agency highlighted by the legality
principle also has positive import for transitional justice. By making public
agents the objects of punishment, advocates of utilitarian legal theories
depend on the possibility that those living under the law could act
differently under a different public face of law. Reflecting back to the
principle of legality, the objection points out that former abusers might act
differently under the laws of a new state. It would be inefficient, pointless,
and ultimately unfair 20 ' to assume otherwise.
It follows that
consequentialist concerns, such as deterrence, are better served in
2 02
transitional circumstances by focusing on post-transitional behavior.
Deontological constructions of legal wrong also invoke a public agent.
As Jerome Hall points out, the legality principle is a solution to the problem
of coercing autonomous agents.2 03 Treating another as an end, and not
merely as a means, assumes that they had the relevant capacities and
information to make a decision. 20 4 Knowledge and intent are central in this
model of agency. Assignments of blame and responsibility further assume
that the accused can appreciate the wrongness of her actions. Thus,
punishment is designed to reflect on the nature of the wrong, treating the
criminal as an agent who has chosen her acts. Owing to this account, Georg
Hegel argued that punishment is a right of the criminal, reflective of her
autonomy. 205 Reciprocally, if an agent could not have known that her
action was illegal, as distinct from simply wrong, then there is no ground to
20 6
hold her criminally liable.

199. Duff, supra note 164, at 233-40; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the
Theory of Responsibility 95 (1970); Primoratz, supra note 195, at 145-54; Hampton, supra

note 68, at 208.
200. See infra Part IV for a further discussion of this point.
201. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes thought that the common law would "by the
necessity of its nature" give up such words. Holmes, supra note 196, at 459. Basic
principles of fairness have become more entrenched with the prevalence of rule utilitarian
decision procedures that adopt deontological standards for qualification to and utilitarian
measures of punishment. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principlesfor the Distribution
of Criminal Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 19 (1988). Holmes himself retains excuses for
infants and for the insane because they are not able to participate as full public agents in their
decisions. Thus, while he may not approve of the term "fairness" sneaking into the
conversation, it is clear that he would agree with the point in this context.
202. See infra Part IV.
203. See Hall, supra note 138, at 58-64.
204. See Duff, supra note 164, at 14-38.
205. Georg Hegel, Philosophy of Right
100 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1952) (1821). But see John Deigh, On the Right to Be Punished: Some Doubts, 94 Ethics
191 (1984) (critiquing Georg Hegel's argument).

206. Duff, supra note 164, at 20-38.
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In a transitional context, trials violate the autonomy of agents cast in their
public roles under the law by punishing them for actions that were not, in
fact, against the public face of law propagated by the abusive regime. Note
that this does not extend to moral blame. The legality excuse defended in
this Article is exclusively a function of the split between moral and public
20 7
agency and the corresponding division between moral and legal blame.
The principle of legality provides a shield against legal punishment only.
There is plenty of room left for assignments of moral blame and
20 8
responsibility for repair and reform.
Beyond the deontological concern for treating individuals as ends,
Immanuel Kant is well-known for his assertion that law is a tool for solving
the problem of justice among a race of devils. 20 9 Even for Kant, then, law
is, at least in part, a coercive tool, playing a role similar to that played in
more purely consequentialist theories of criminal punishment. Pointing out
that devils should not be punished for failures of the public face of law is
simply to say that it is both unjust and pointless to "make someone suffer a
punishment unless the individual was given a fair warning that his act
would bring it down on him." 2 10 The claim here is not that abusers from
the past would have acted differently if they had been living in a different
legal culture; rather, the claim from legality is that it is unfair and inefficient
to assume that they would not have.
Trials, as opposed to private condemnation or moral blame, assume the
existence of a legal prohibition in the construction of responsibility and the
justification of punishment. Understanding the agency significance of
legality puts an important positive spin on objections to transitional trials
derived from the legality principal. Specifically, by recognizing the role of
an abusive public face of law in pre-transitional abuses, transitional regimes
can recognize not only the transitional potential of political, social, and
legal reform, but also the transitional potential of individual abusers.
Transitional jurisprudence must take normative account of this and design
transitional procedures that reflect potential for change. The legality
objection is one result of this accounting. As is argued in the remainder of
this Article, proper distribution of an excuse based on legality provides both
a normative structure for hybrid programs of transitional justice and
practical guidance for executing these programs in particular transitional
circumstances.
C. An Affirmative Excuse Based on Legality
Pre-transitional bad acts reflect an abusive public culture. An abusive
culture, in turn, is linked to broad complicity in abuses committed by and

207. This distinction is already familiar in the common law. See Ashworth, supra note
138, at 42-43.
208. Jaspers, supranote 192, at 67-75.
209. Kant, supra note 82, at 24-32.
210. Golding, supra note 57, at 181.
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under pre-transitional regimes. Broad complicity poses problems for justice
in transitions both because of the large numbers of potential defendants and
because it exposes deeper, more theoretical, problems for criminal trials in
transitions posed by legality. A transitional movement must sort through
these problems if it hopes to seek justice for past wrongs. The key shift in
thinking motivated here is a realization that these challenges do more than
pose problems for programs of prosecution in transitions-they point out
transitional differences to 2be
accounted for, not merely accommodated, by
11
transitional jurisprudence.
Because transitional justice is an exercise in nonideal theory, 2 12 a full
accounting of these elements should provide some positive descriptive
significance for a jurisprudential theory of transitional justice. One key
feature of transitions that must be accounted for is that there is a transition.
Stable state justice is a matter of enforcing and further refining an operating
2 13
vision of right. In transitions the vision itself is under construction.
Complicity, legality, and other challenges to justice in transition serve
practical and theoretical notice of the shift. 214 The challenge for transitional
justice is to find a way to address past wrongs that is consistent with the
basic tenets of the rule of law but takes principled account of the fact that
there is a transition.
Taking note of the connection between pre-transitional conditions and
pre-transitional abuses on the one hand, and between transitional
movements and commitments to alter the public face of law on the other,
indicates how this challenge can be met. Advocates for criminal trials in
transitions are rightly concerned about limitations on and objections to
prosecutions because, as they see it, a transition that fails to prosecute all
those implicated in past abuses compromises its duty to do justice, though
necessity may demand such a compromise. 2 15 In my view, this is too
drastic a conclusion. If the factors that impose limitations on criminal
prosecutions describe unique conditions that have theoretical significance
for transitional jurisprudence then it is not the case that limited prosecutions
are compromises against justice in transitions. Quite the contrary, the point
is that broad prosecutorial strategies are not transitional. They are illconsidered attempts to recreate stable state justice in transitions that fail to
take account of transitional realities and to capitalize on transitional
opportunities.
Recognizing the role of the public face of law in abusive states in light of
transitional commitments to legality erases the apparent justice gap opened
by the difference in the numbers of those implicated in past wrongs and the
211. But see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 7 (arguing that transitional justice must
accommodate its challenges just as stable state justice must accommodate its challenges).
212. De Greiff, supra note 6, at 79-82.
213. See Ackerman, supra note 6, at 99-112.
214. See Teitel, supra note 16, at 39-49.
215. Douglass Cassel, Lessonsfrom the Americas: Guidelinesfor InternationalResponse
to Amnesties for Atrocities, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 197; see Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2602-03.
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capacity of transitions to conduct criminal trials. Broad complicity and
correspondingly large numbers of potential defendants reflect the fact that
publicly and institutionally approved practices and social norms fuel pretransitional abuses. Given that most who participate in pre-transitional
abuses live under an abusive public face of law, broad prosecution
programs would not be appropriate. It is not merely that transitions cannot
punish all of those implicated in past abuses, it is that most of those
implicated ought not be punished.
Legality concerns are best met, then, not by giving up on criminal trials
altogether but by determining who might qualify for an affirmative defense.
While the details of such an excuse would be context dependent, for
purposes of advancing the conversation, I offer the following:
DEFENSE FROM LEGALITY

It is an affirmative defense for the actor engaged in the conduct
2 16
charged to constitute an offense if the act reflects a reasonable
interpretation of the prevailing public face of law. "Public face of
law" encompasses formal legislation, executive orders, the body of
prevailing public threats, institutional expectations represented by
institutional agents 2 7 and commonly represented public and legal
expectations as they would have been perceived by a person in the
actor's condition and position at the time of his act.
The legality defense is not available if:
(1) The act is not within the scope of expectations presented by the
2 18
public face of law.
(2) The act does not reflect the public demands on the claiming
agent.
(3) The agent is not, himself or herself, subject to the public face of
law.

2 19

216. "Reasonable" is meant to capture the narrow rationality of a public agent under the
law. There is, as will be maintained throughout this Article, nothing reasonable, in the sense
of justifiable, about murder, rape, or genocide. Rather, the point is that a legal agent qua
legal agent only knows what the law demands by interpreting the law through the body of
social beliefs and official actions, which constitute the public face of law. That moral agents
have an abiding duty to recognize the evil in an abusive public face of law is, from the point
of view of the legality principle and its focus on justified uses of punitive authority, beside
the point.
217. Particularly in respect of the role of official actions in the construction of the public
face of law, the legality defense shares the same concerns that underlie Model Penal Code
sections 2.04(3)(b) and 2.04(4), which provide an affirmative defense based on mistakes of
law attributable to statutes, statements by judges, and interpretations by executive
authorities. Model Penal Code § 2.04 (2002).
218. Sub-point (1) secures prosecutorial privilege in cases where agents move beyond the
basic scope of the culture of abuse.
219. Sub-points (2) and (3) clarify conditions of recognition for agents identified in subpoint (1), and provide independent ways to negate the defense where specific proof of
motive cannot be produced.
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(4) The agent is directly responsible to another body of law and is
not under direct threat from an abusive public face of law.
(5) The actor is under obligations that reflect a special status to
which he or she has voluntarily submitted where this status
is
220
expected to supersede all other demands on his or her behavior.
Providing a defense to agents of pre-transitional abuse based on the
legality principle performs the necessary practical and theoretical task of
converting the unique characteristics that define pre-transitional abuses and
transitions into normative conditions relevant to transitional justice.
Extension of the excuse recognizes that many, if not most, pre-transitional
bad acts were committed by individuals who, given the nature of the public
face of law under the abusive regime, were justified in believing that what
they did was right, necessary, or at least not subject to legal punishment.
Recognizing transitional commitments to the rule of law in this way also
highlights the prospective nature of transitional justice. 22 1 The function of
trials in stable states is to reaffirm commitments to right established by
law. 222

Transitional justice is, in large part, a process of rejecting old

commitments embodied in the abusive public face of law to establish new
223
commitments to democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.
Transitions are defined by the need to produce significant changes in public
norms, practices, and consciousness to carry an abuse-ridden society into a
new period characterized by commitments to human rights and the rule of
law. 224

Organizing transitional justice programs around recognition and

extension of an excuse to individual actors serves these prospective
transitional justice goals in a number of ways.
First, it highlights the potential and necessity to transform citizens of an
abusive regime into citizens of a post-transitional state. The principle of
legality is as much concerned with agents as laws. The proposed excuse
recognizes a distinction between individuals acting in a private versus a
public mode. Many of those who committed abuses in the past were acting
in a public mode in ways that were, taking the totality of pre-transitional
public conditions into account, theoretically predictable. The fact of broad
complicity points out that part of the process of justice in transitions is
transforming norms. The legality objection points out that most of those
complicit are candidates for change.
Second, focusing on the role of public norms in abuses sets the stage for
production of a full account of the past that allows a transitional movement
220. Sub-points (4) and (5) provide for prosecution of people in special positions that
require conduct above common public practice. The focus of (4) is on leaders responsible to
international treaties and covenants. The interest in (5) is in individuals who have freely
taken oaths of conduct that supercede their statuses as public agents.
221. De Greiff, supra note 62, at 93-95; cf Ackerman, supra note 6, at 70-73
(distinguishing between constitutional creation and corrective justice).
222. Habermas, supra note 164, at 115, 171-74.
223. See Minow, supra note 36, at 2-5.
224. See Teitel, supra note 16, at 28-33.

2648

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

to mark sites for change and publicly establish commitments to new norms.
Proper extension of the excuse requires establishment of a clear historical
record of the past to determine who should and who should not be excused
and to further the necessary process of converting the old public face of law
into the new. Trials, on the other hand, run the risk of neglecting the fact
that there is a transition. By trying to keep transitions in the mold of stable
state criminal jurisprudence, trial advocates fail to take account of the fact
that transitional justice must be both prospective and retrospective in ways
2 25
that stable state justice is not.
This proposed defense invites obvious objections, particularly when it is
pointed out that abuses commonly violate the most basic tenets of civilized
law. 226 Concerns may also be raised as to the premium the excuse puts on
the principle of legality. For example, consequentialists might argue for
rejection or suspension of the legality principle in favor of practical goals
such as deterrence and incapacitation. Parts III and IV address these
concerns. Building on this discussion, Part V suggests how transitional
justice procedures can be excuse centered and how this approach provides
justification, support, and guidance for truth commissions.
III. DEFENDING THE DEFENSE: OTHER SOURCES OF LAW

Part II argued against individual criminal liability in transitions by
making use of the principle non malum sine lege, commonly called the
legality principle. This position may seem unattractive for a number of
reasons. For example, a natural law theorist might object, arguing that laws
demand obedience as a function of their proximity to natural right; state
codes inconsistent with natural law cannot demand obedience; natural law
exists independently of state codes; and natural law creates direct
obligations regardless of conflicting state codes. 227 From this, a naturalist
could conclude that everyone has a standing obligation to the natural law
228
that is not excused by interference from immoral state codes of conduct.
229
This is an argument with some currency in transitional justice debates.
23 1
It was used at Nuremberg 230 and in the German border guard cases.
Beyond this historical significance, the basic line of response, which
appeals to a source of "law" outside of state codes, can be applied to justify
225. Id. at 11-26.
226. See Cassel, supra note 215, at 199-208.
227. See generally Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica passim (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Encyclopadia Britannica 1989) (1273); 1 Blackstone, supra note
138, at *1-37; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 65-78 (London, George Routledge & Sons, 2d ed.
1886) (1651).
228. Duff, supra note 164, at 75.
229. Teitel, supra note 16, at 14-15; see Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life
179, 246 (1999).
230. U.S. State Dep't, Office of Int'l Info., The Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trial XVIII
(1945) [hereinafter Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trial].
231. Trial of Border Guards, Berlin State Court, No. (523) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91), supra note

145, at 576, 579; Elster, supra note 21, at 238-39.
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punishment based on, for example, international law. This section responds
to this line of argument by motivating a distinction between legal
culpability and moral responsibility based on epistemic duties unique to
agents in their public modes. The strict liability approach to blame
suggested by the appeal to natural law does not account for the role that the
public face of law plays in the lives of public agents and the construction of
legal blame.
A. Fearsof Radical Skepticism
Both for purposes of the argument and because I think it is true, I will
grant that murdering thousands of innocents is wrong, even if no domestic
laws recognize that it is so. 2 32 The argument for an affirmative defense
does not imply that there are not higher callings than the laws on the
books. 2 33 Nor does the argument in Part II imply that bad laws can demand
obedience. 234 The focus is on the fact that the public face of law in abusive
states intervenes between individuals and moral right in such a way that
people living in these regimes may make mistakes about what they ought
and ought not to do. 235 Because the source of this confusion benefits from
the apparent stamp of official state approval, 236 is external to the agent, and
is, by definition, removed in the process of transition, the legality principle
points out that punishment is inappropriate. That this is so implies neither
that pre-transitional abuses were right nor that those implicated did not have
a duty to know better and do otherwise.
The naturalist objection is, at its core, fed by fear of a skepticism of
duties to the good that the argument in this Article does not implicate. To
illuminate the point it is useful to consider the full extent of the naturalist
critique by way of a discussion of excuse defenses. Mistakes of fact
generally provide an excuse from legal blame. 237 Consider, for example, a
hiker who, walking through a public forest, unwittingly takes a path leading
onto private property, thus committing the crime of trespass. 2 38 Unless this

232. I am hardly alone in this view. See, e.g., Dworkin, Internal Realism, supranote 133,
at 2 (extending arguments appearing in Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth, supra note 133).
233. See Hart, supra note 141, at 617-21.
234. Id.; see also Plato, Crito, in The Dialogues of Plato 213 (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
William Benton 1989) (380 B.C.).
235. See supra note 216 (noting that the potential mistake here is meant to capture the
limited scope of legal agency under the legality principle). As argued at greater length
below, no truly reasonable moral agent could make a mistake about their duty not to
perpetrate the abuses endemic to pre-transitional regimes.
236. This distinguishes the legality excuse as I am developing it from the more familiar
excuse of ignorance of the law, which is not, in most circumstances, a viable defense against
criminal liability, though it may mitigate culpability.
237. Ashworth, supra note 138, at 164-65; Hall, supra note 138, at 360-64.
238. This example and the argument for radical skepticism is taken from philosopher
Gideon Rosen. Gideon Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, 18 Philosophical
Perspectives 295 (2004) [hereinafter Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility]; Gideon
Rosen, Responsibility and Moral Ignorance (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available

2650

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

is a strict liability offense the trespasser would not, and should not, be
blamed for his trespass if he both did not know and could (or should) not
239
have known that he was walking on private rather than public land.
The naturalist objection sees the legality defense as proposing a parity
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of the good such that blameless
errors of right should provide an excuse on par with mistakes of fact. The
argument proceeds from the premise that blameless moral ignorance is just
as possible as blameless ignorance of facts. There are really two ideas here.
The first is that moral ignorance is possible. The second is that one can be
blameless for these mistakes. Sincere differences in moral belief provide
ample proof of the first assertion. While a relativist may look at such
differences and claim that neither disputant is "mistaken," the abuses
perpetrated in pre-transitional regimes provide examples of opinions that
challenge the moral agnostic to stay neutral. 240 The more interesting issue
is whether blame is appropriate when a wrongdoer acts in accord with a
mistaken belief that what he is doing is right, or, at least, not wrong.
The legality excuse contends, without apparent limitation, that blame is
not appropriate if bad acts are functions of social beliefs, practices, and
norms. While the proposed defense is not a cultural defense there are some
parallels worth considering in light of the naturalist objection. Consider, for
example, a Hittite living in the Near East in 100 B.C. 24 1 The Hittite would
have been shaped by the ubiquitous practice of slavery and the commonly
shared belief system that made slavery a perfectly acceptable practice. He
would have grown up thinking that, while it was bad to be a slave, there is
242
nothing inherently wrong with the practice of slavery.
Of course, it is one thing to claim that the Hittite did not know that
slavery is wrong and quite another to contend that this mistake is excusable.
To render the Hittite blameless for his mistake it is necessary to argue that
he did not breach a duty to "rethink the non-controversial principles that
form[ed] the framework for [his] relations with other people." 243 This
added premise makes a claim about epistemic duty, what one has a duty to
know in the context of norm-guided action. The legality excuse raises
concerns for the naturalist because it seems to claim that duties to right end
with the duty to know what public norms require, no matter how evil or
misguided those norms might be. This is an uncomfortable proposition.

at http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2OOl/readings/index.html
Responsibility and Moral Ignorance].

[hereinafter Rosen,

239. J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in 1 Aristotelian Society Proceedings LVII, at 39
(1956) (discussing the duty to take reasonable care to avoid preventable ignorance).
240. Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law 24-35 (1997).
241. This example is borrowed from Rosen, Responsibility and Moral Ignorance, supra
note 238, and Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, supra note 238, at 304.
242. The Hittite is not alone in this belief Aristotle famously argues for slavery based on
an ontology that includes natural slaves and natural masters. Aristotle, Politics bk. I, chs. 4-8
(W.D. Ross ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1989).
243. Rosen, Responsibility and Moral Ignorance, supra note 238, at 12.
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Fortunately, there are good reasons to doubt the veracity of the added
premise. Specifically, it seems to miss a distinction between mistakes of
fact and mistakes of right. Focusing on this distinction suggests that we
may have a duty to know our epistemic duties, a duty that goes farther and
is more demanding than is reflected in the quick switch from mistakes of
fact to mistakes of the good. Aristotle provides just such an argument in his
244
Nicomachean Ethics.
B. Mistakes About ParticularsVersus Mistakes of the Good
In book three of Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle takes aim at Plato's claim
that nobody does what is bad knowing that it is bad. 245 Plato's position is,
in Aristotle's view, tantamount to thinking that evil acts are not voluntarily
committed. 2 46 Adoption of such a view shatters intuitive notions of blame
and praise by denying that anyone can be blamed for their evil acts.
Aristotle's response attempts to reconstruct the possibility of blaming
evildoers by distinguishing between mistakes of particulars and mistakes of
right. Aristotle writes,
Now every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he
ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men
become unjust and in general bad; but the term "involuntary" tends to be
used not if a man is ignorant of what is to his advantage-for it is not
mistaken purpose that causes involuntary action (it leads rather to
wickedness), nor ignorance of the universal (for that men are blamed), but
ignorance of particulars, i.e. of the circumstances of the action and the
objects with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both pity and
pardon depend,
since the person who is ignorant of any of these, acts
involuntarily. 247
On this view, ignorance that may pardon is not of right and wrong but of
critical exigent facts and circumstances that thwart an individual's ability to
achieve the intended consequences of her actions. Bad acts perpetrated in
the fog of ignorance of particulars are excused 24 8 because the action is truly
involuntary. To use one of Aristotle's examples, if Metrope had known that
the figure looming in the darkness was not an enemy soldier but his son he
would not have shot. Due to this mistake, Metrope cannot be said to have

244. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (W.D. Ross ed. & trans., Encyclopedia Britannica
1989).

245. Id. bk. III; Plato, Meno *77 c-e (W.K.C. Guthrie trans., Penguin Books Ltd. 1956)
(380 B.C.). Plato's position, like the ignorance line attributed to legality above, is grounded
in the claim that those who commit evil acts do so out of ignorance, simply mistaking the
bad for the good. While Plato's position is much broader, in that he does not distinguish
between blameless and blameworthy mistakes of right, it is analytically close enough to the
legality line to make Aristotle's response worth considering in the present context.
246. This is, as we will see, importantly different from "involuntary." On Aristotle's
view, involuntary acts qualify for an excuse.
247. Aristotle, supra note 242, bk. III, ch. 1.
248. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 48 (Little, Brown and Co. 1923) (1881).
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voluntarily shot his son. His involuntary mistake of fact qualifies him for
pity for his mistake and the loss of his son, not blame.
Ignorance of right and wrong is, as Aristotle points out, quite different
from ignorance of particulars. Failing to seek out and know the nature of
good will certainly lead to bad acts due to ignorance. Unlike Metrope's
mistake, however, these are errors of evaluation. Perpetrators of such acts
can only be called wicked. The wicked actor intends both act and outcome,
though she mistakes bad for good. 24 9

If a wicked person who has

intentionally done wicked things cannot be blamed, it is hard to see who
can be.
This distinction has obvious application to the proposed legality excuse.
Consider the case of a Hutu who engages in genocide because he truly
believes what the public face of law tells him-that the Tutsi "cockroaches"
must be exterminated. 250 According to the foregoing discussion of legality,
true believers of this ilk should qualify for an excuse because their beliefs
are traceable to an abusive public face of law. On Aristotle's view, the
Hutu's mistake is a mistake of evil for good. He is wicked. The wicked
deserve blame, not pity. Therefore, the Hutu's ignorance does not excuse
his act because the ignorance is an expression of bad character. 2 5 1 This
claim for responsibility in transitions is bolstered by the fact that in abusive
states there are those who recognize the evil around them and actively work
against it. 252 If it is not impossible to know right from wrong in an abusive
state then there seems no reason not to hold responsible and punish those
who fail to live up to their ethical duty to know right from wrong.
Aristotle's arguments seem to provide grounds for a devastating attack
on the excuse defended in Part II. As it stands, the legality excuse appears
to shift blame for bad acts, via bad character, to an abusive public face of
law. By focusing on a distinction between ignorance of particulars and
ignorance of the good and corresponding differences in epistemic duty,
Aristotle seems to have destroyed the premise that individuals have no duty
to inquire beyond the claims of right present to them in the form of the
public face of law. 253 Therefore, it seems appropriate to blame pre-

249. Aristotle, supra note 242, bk. III, ch. 1.
250. Though contested by the defendants in the "Media Trial," the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda held that "cockroach" is the appropriate translation of inyenzi, which
was used to refer to Tutsis during the periods leading up to and including the 1994 holocaust
in Rwanda. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T,
Judgment 179 (Dec. 3, 2003).
251. Aristotle, supra note 242, bk. III, ch. 1. As a further test, Aristotle points out that
"the doing of an act that is called involuntary in virtue of ignorance of this sort must be
painful and involve repentance." Id.
252. See, e.g., Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 110-44 (describing the efforts of Paul
Rusesabagina, manager of the H6tel des Mille Collines, to provide safe haven for Tutsis
during the 1994 genocide).
253. A similar argument can be made from philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre's argument for
radical responsibility. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness 6-12 (1956). On first flush,
the excuse I have proposed may, in Jean-Paul Sartre's terms, seem like the worst sort of "bad
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transitional abusers even if they act from real ignorance
that corresponds to
25 4
the public face of law. They are wicked, after all.
C. Legality and the Epistemic Role of Law in PublicAgency
The Aristotelian/naturalist response misses the critical role that the state
plays in constructing legal responsibility. In abusive regimes the public
face of law is such that people can conclude that abuses are not against the
law. Focusing on this suggests two responses to the natural law objection
as bolstered by Aristotle's distinction. First, the state must accept some
responsibility for ignorance-producing conditions under the old regime.
Second, the disjunction between law and moral right highlights a distinction
between private moral agency and public legal agency. Taking account of
this suggests that a distinction between moral culpability and legal liability
should be made in transitions. 2 55 This approach preserves the possibility of
moral blame but, by forgoing legal punishment, appreciates the
commitment to fair warning that girds the legality principle.
Aristotle's defense of moral responsibility comes down to an argument
that we each have an unmediated duty to know our duty. While this
position may be sustainable, it does not properly apply in the legal context.
To see how this is so it is important to focus on the conditions that create
excusable ignorance. Even for Aristotle ignorance of particulars is not a
complete defense. 256 We each have a basic responsibility to know facts and
conditions that a reasonable person in our position would know. Ignorance
produced by laziness and inattention is not excusable. Agents are excused,
however, for "ignorance for which they are not, themselves,
responsible." 25 7 If our ignorance is a result of deception or misinformation
from another source then we are not to blame when this ignorance leads us
to do harm. Despite this admission, Aristotle stands by his claim that
"wickedness is voluntary" 25 8 and not to be excused no matter the role that
external conditions might play.
These positions may seem somewhat at odds. The solution, which is
resident in Aristotle's argument, is that agents have different levels of
epistemic duty with respect to particulars on the one hand and the good on
the other. Specifically, what Aristotle must argue is that, as autonomous
and reflective beings moral agents have the capacity and, thus, the duty to
discover directly the moral truth on their own. While conditions in the
world may affect moral knowledge, the external world does not mediate
between agents and the good. Therefore, conditions in the world cannot
waive duties to know the good.
faith." The distinction that I press in this section, between moral responsibility and legal
liability, provides a response to Sartre just as it does to Aristotle and the naturalists.
254. Primoratz, supra note 195, at 75-79.
255. Jaspers, supra note 192, at 25-27, 45-64.
256. Aristotle, supra note 242, bk. III, ch. 1.
257. Id.
258. Id.

2654

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Knowledge of particulars, by contrast, can only be gained through our
senses. By virtue of this fact, conditions in the world directly mediate
between the truth about particulars and knowledge of particulars. Agents
do not, then, have exclusive control over their knowledge of particulars. In
Metrope's case, for example, the play of light and shadows, conditions of
the world that he could not control, led to his mistaking his son for an
enemy soldier. 2 59 It follows that agents cannot be kept to the same stringent
epistemic duties that hold with respect to the nature of the good. For
knowledge of particulars the highest reasonable epistemic duty is the duty
to take care. 260 For knowledge of the good the duty is absolute.
Wicked people who do wicked things should be blamed. Pre-transitional
abusers, wicked people indeed, should be subject to blame. Nonetheless,
they should not be subjected to legal punishment. To understand how these
views are consistent it is critical to focus on the limited impact of the
proposed excuse. The legality excuse does not propose to exonerate
wrongdoing or to shift epistemic duties. Provision of the excuse does not
imply that no wrong has been done or that those implicated in pretransitional abuses should not have acted otherwise. It is a legal excuse
derived from the failure of a regime to provide fair warning of the legal
consequences of an action. The excuse focuses on the privilege to punish
and the conditions that a state must meet to claim this privilege. It points
out that if a state fails to meet its burden, it must forgo its privilege to
punish. Pre-transitional states fail to meet burdens of fair warning. It
follows that a transitional regime, as heir to the past, must provide a legal
excuse for those who acted within the behavioral boundaries established by
an abusive public face of law.
Responses to legality concerns that focus on individual responsibility
indulge in a non sequitur. The failure of a state to fulfill the formal
requirements that it must to claim the privilege to punish is separable from
concerns relating to ethical duties to know right from wrong and moral
obligations to act appropriately. A state's duty to inform its citizens about
what the law demands also has epistemic consequences. The legality
26 1
principle requires fair warning as a prerequisite to just punishment.
What the principle highlights is that, from a criminal law point of view, the
state necessarily mediates between the natural law and citizens. It may be
that a state that fails to conform domestic laws to the natural law does not
deserve faith and respect. 262 It may even be true that there is no obligation
to obey bad law so that state law that is contrary to the natural law cannot
bind citizens. 263 None of this implies that a state that has propagated an
abusive public face of law is entitled to punish citizens who obey just

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id.
See Hall, supra note 138, at 58-59.
Fuller, supra note 138, at 657-61; Hart, supra note 141, at 618-19.
Hart, supra note 141, at 616-17.
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because that law does not conform '264
to the natural law. Such a situation
would be both "brutal" and "absurd.
The state is a conduit for knowledge of right and wrong within the
pathway of criminal justice leading up to prosecution and punishment.
Therefore, while citizens may have the capacity and bear the duty to know
the good on an individual basis, there can be no criminal consequence for
failure to fulfill this epistemic duty.2 65 The only epistemic duty that can
have criminal consequences is the duty to know what the public face of law
demands. 266 Where, as in abusive states, the public face of law creates
conditions in which people can be led to make mistakes about what is right,
those who act out those mistakes cannot be held criminally accountable
without violating the legality principle 267 because they have met their
public duty to know what the law demands. They may be blamed for their
moral failures, but they may not, consistent with core demands of the rule
of law, be punished criminally. 2 68 Reciprocally, a regime that has enabled
269
that mistake loses its moral entitlement to punish.
None of this is inconsistent with praising those who rise above the
abusive conditions of a pre-transitional state. We can, and should, celebrate
the Oskar Schindlers of the world. That we do, however, does not require
punishing those who follow the law. Legal wrong is not the same as
wickedness. The state bears responsibility for defining legal wrong and for
establishing conditions consistent with legal education and habituation of
citizens. Given this duty, citizens in their public roles as legal agents may
rely on the public face of law as the standard bearer of legal right and
wrong. When the state fails to do its part, the legality principle dictates that
the state must sacrifice its privilege of punishment in deference to fairness
and respect for the autonomy of its citizens. For a transitional regime to do
270
otherwise would put it in no better a moral position than its predecessor.
The excuse proposed here is limited to legal agents in their public modes.
It has no footing in and no consequences for moral agency. Moral blame
may still be appropriate for the knowing commission of any act that is
wrong. 27 1 A morally blameworthy act may also have legal consequences,
but this need not be the case. In a similar vein, morally appropriate acts
may sometimes be subject to criminal consequences. There is, as a

264. Fuller, supra note 58, at 59.
265. See Hart, supra note 141, at 619-20.
266. Consistent with this view, mistakes of law generally do not provide an excuse from
legal punishment. See Holmes, supra note 248, at 40-41. But see Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance
of the Law Is an Excuse-But Onlyfor the Virtuous, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 127 (1997).
267. Hart, supra note 141, at 619-20.
268. The distinction proposed here between legal and moral punishment is not new. For
its application in the context of transitional justice, however, credit is due to Karl Jaspers.
Jaspers, supra note 192.

269. Fuller, supra note 138, at 655.
270. Fuller, supra note 58, at 39, 248-49; Fuller, supra note 138, at 655.
271. Aristotle, supra note 242, bk. III, ch. 1.
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practical matter, no necessity in this relationship, 27 2 and therefore no legal
right to punish may be drawn from morality alone.
The legality principle respects the distinction between legal and moral
blame by marking a derivative distinction between individuals in their
public legal modes and agents in their private moral modes. People in their
roles as legal agents are operated on by the laws, which make claims on
their behavior.
Legal agency comes with its own obligations and
epistemology. Legal punishment pursues those who fail in their duties as
legal agents. Punishment is forgone when agents meet the demands placed
on them in public, despite the fact that they lie to their mothers about taking
the garbage out. The legality principle points out that the same argument
goes for all other acts that are not prohibited under the law. Actions mala
in se, like acts mala prohibita, are punishable only if prohibited by law.
That they are wrong regardless of the law is beside the point.
D. Justification andApplication
This position is consistent with a familiar distinction, made in all ruleordered practices, between justification and application. 2 73 Games, for
example, operate with a specific set of rules. From time to time some of
these rules may reveal themselves to be less than ideal with respect to the
greater goals of the game. Movements develop and opportunities to change
the rules are presented. These opportunities are limited to times and places
outside of actual games, however. Therefore, if a striker in a soccer match
is called offside she might appeal the accuracy of the call but it would not
be appropriate for her to appeal the fairness of the offside rule. In the game,
the rules are applied. Conversations about their justification are reserved
for other times and forums.
Law is similar to games in recognizing a firm distinction between
justification and application. 274 The principle of legality is an expression of
this commitment. The debate over the source of law and the legitimacy of
law is part of the broader conversations that rationalize, justify, and,
eventually, generate laws. 275 They are the sorts of conversations engaged
in by legislators, policy wonks, citizens, and sometimes even philosophers,
and are reserved for the senate floor, classrooms, and civil society. Fetal
norms that have not completed their gestation do not, until fully mature as
sanctioned law, justify punishment.
To illustrate the point, imagine that I am driving at thirty-four miles per
hour ("mph") on a stretch of road that is clearly marked as a thirty-five mph
zone. When pulled over and charged with speeding I contest the charge,
claiming that I was within the marked speed limit. Now imagine that the

272. See generally Hart, supra note 141.
273. Jdrgen Habermas, Justification and Application:
112 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2d ed. 1995).
274. Habermas, supra note 164, at 115, 172.
275. Id.

Remarks on Discourse Ethics 19-

20061

AN EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH

2657

officer agrees. He adds, however, that this is his usual patrol and he has
noticed an unacceptable number of fatal accidents on this road.
Furthermore, his department has conducted a study, the conclusion of
which is clear: If cars traveling that stretch of road drove at twenty-five
mph dozens of lives would be saved every year. Thus, he says, the speed
limit really, by all measures practical and moral, should be twenty-five
mph. He writes me a ticket for going nine mph over the correct-not the
posted-speed limit.
Now we go to court. The officer acknowledges that I was within the
posted limit, but presents the judge with the findings of the study.
Intrigued, the court conducts an evidentiary hearing, finds in favor of the
patrolman, and fines me for driving faster than I should have. In my appeal,
my argument is clear: The judge and the patrolman overstepped their
bounds. It was their job to apply the law as they found it. By overstepping,
276
they have created a Kafkaesque world of inscrutable legal expectations.
They have also unjustly used the law to punish me for an act that was not,
by definition, illegal at all.
It would still be unjust for the judge to punish me for speeding in this
case if I revealed that I had read the study before that fateful evening. It
would be unjust even if I agreed with the study, and thought that everyone
should drive twenty-five mph. Even if all of this were true, the laws on the
books set the limit at thirty-five mph. More importantly, the signs on the
road clearly read "Speed Limit: 35 mph." My duty as a legal agent was,
then, to respect that thirty-five mph limit. So long as I have done this, I am
guilty of no legal transgression, even if, in a moment of private reflection, I
agree that I should have kept it under twenty-five mph.
The same is true of someone who abided by the laws in place under an
abusive regime. Brought before a transitional tribunal he rightly may claim
that he was following the law at the time. It would be odd and out of place
for the judge to respond by saying that those were bad laws and the
defendant should have known better. Just as it is not a defense in law to
claim that the law is wrong, 277 there cannot be a legal obligation to ignore
or break laws that go against moral law. This is not to say that there is no
moral obligation to disobey evil laws. As Socrates argues in the Apology,
there is. 278 In a more contemporary vein, under United States law, those
who claim objective fear of future persecution may not gain asylum if they
participated in persecution of another, 2 79 even if under duress. 280 By
contrast, while applicants may not normally claim fear of persecution based
276. More than most applications, "Kafkaesque" is singularly appropriate here. In Franz
Kafka's The Trial, the main character, K., confronts a situation similar to that which I am
describing here. The duty of clear warning that is captured by the legality principle is meant
to guard against the specter that Kafka constructs. See generally Franz Kafka, The Trial
(Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 1998) (1925).
277. Plato, supra note 234, passim.
278. Plato, Apology, in The Dialogues of Plato, supra note 234, at 200 passim.
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000).
280. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
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on threats of lawful punishment in their home countries, 28 1 if the law
violated demanded participation in persecution, then fear of punishment
based on a refusal to participate can provide a basis for asylum. 28 2 This
apparent disparity is explained by the fact that duress is a legal excuse, not a
moral justification 283 and "asylee" is a moral, not legal, status. 284 Denial of
asylum to an applicant who has, under duress, participated in the
persecution of others, is acceptable
because it is a function of moral
28 5
culpability, not legal liability.
Legal liability is different from moral culpability. The legality principle
marks this distinction, recognizing that, while private moral considerations
may be relevant to the justification of law and to private decisions to obey
or not, these private reflections do not provide warrant for public sanction.
Absent preexisting and legitimate, if not just, public threats, states lose their
privilege to punish. None of this, as is discussed further in Part V, excludes
advancement of various forms of private guilt. Nor, as is argued below,
does it exclude punishment of high-level leaders.
E. InternationalLaw: DistinguishingHigh-Level Leadersfrom Those
Excused
Those interested in prosecuting present-day abusers need not rely on
natural law, moral law, or other abstractions.
Our contemporary
international human rights culture28 6 boasts a well-stocked toolbox of
treaties, charters, and jurisprudence of crimes against humanity and jus
cogens law, each of which may serve as touchstones for transitional
trials. 28 7 This section argues that these sources do not provide warrant to
prosecute those who live under an abusive public face of law, but do
provide ground for prosecuting high-level leaders exposed directly to
threats of punishment under international law.
Crimes against humanity have been in the toolbox since at least the
seventeenth century, 288 but came into prominent use at Nuremberg. 2 89 The
Nuremberg Tribunals determined that unconditional surrender entitled the

281. Saleh v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1992).
282. Islami v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 2005); Bah v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 348 (5th

Cir. 2003).
283. Ashworth, supra note 138, at 195; Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals
*236-38 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1798).
284. See Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988).

285. Happold, supra note 87, at 1158-63.
286. Rorty, supra note 17, at 115-16.
287. Cassel, supra note 215, at 197 (describing the international response to human rights
violations); Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2546-96.
288. 3 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace bk. III, ch. X (Richard Tuck ed.,
Liberty Fund 2005) (1625); Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. III, chs. I & VIII
(James Brown Scott ed., Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. Wash. 1916) (1758);
Richard Zouche, An Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law Between Nations,
and Questions Concerning the Same (J.L. Brierly trans., Camegie Inst. 1911) (1650).
289. Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trial, supra note 230, at XVIII.
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Allies to establish criminal laws ex post facto. 29 0 This position, which
smacks of "might makes right," is only persuasive, if at all, on a practical
level. Contemporary prosecutions for crimes against humanity need not
rely on this dubious ground, of course. Going forward, the Nuremberg
prosecutions established the international threat of punishment for crimes
1
against humanity.

29

Appeals to crimes against humanity seem to solve legality concerns by
replacing fuzzy presumptions of universal right with solid claims of
international law grounded in historical events and institutions, including
prosecutions at Nuremberg, the International Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia 292 and Rwanda, 293 and, going forward, the International
Criminal Court.294 With slave trading and piracy, crimes against humanity
also form the traditional core of universal jurisdiction, 295 allowing members
of the international community to pursue prosecutions where transitional
regimes are not able or willing. 29 6 In light of recent prosecutions, pursued
by individual states 2 97 and by international tribunals, crimes against
humanity appear to provide both normative justification for transitional
prosecutions and a standing threat of punishment that persists where
domestic laws enable abuse.
The duty and privilege of punishing crimes against humanity falls not on
a particular power but on humanity as a whole. 298 Just as sovereign states

committed to the rule of law must earn the privilege to punish, so too any
authority that seeks to prosecute crimes against humanity must demonstrate
that it has earned this right. Members of the international community assert
the privilege based on previous enforcement efforts and on consistent
defense of core human rights norms.2 99 While compelling as a vision, this
response to legality concerns fails to provide substantial ground for
punishing those who live under an abusive public face of law.
The presence of crimes against humanity on the international scene does
not solve legality concerns in the unique circumstances of abusive states, at
least for those living under an abusive public face of law. To meet core
legality concerns of clarity, regular enforcement, and fair warning, the
threat of prosecution for violations of crimes against humanity must be
290. Id. at XVIIA. This response is assessed in the next section.
291. Minow, supra note 36, at 33.
292. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
293. Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3-4, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
294. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 150.
295. Bruce Broomhall, Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal
Jurisdictionfor Crimes Under InternationalLaw, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 399, 403-06 (2001).

296. Id.
297. Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past
Abuses, 19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 301, 314-55 (2003).
298. Broomhall, supra note 295, at 404-405; Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction
Under InternationalLaw, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785, 789-90 (1988).
299. Randall, supra note 298, at 790; Sriram, supra note 297, at 301.
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present to those on the ground in abusive regimes. Otherwise crimes
against humanity have no more normative significance than remote laws of
foreign states or laws propagated in secret. Unfortunately, for most living
under pre-transitional regimes, international law, including crimes against
humanity, is obscured by the local and immediate demands of an abusive
public face of law.
Just as abusive regimes operate to obscure the demands of natural right,
so do they hide from domestic view the threats and demands of
international law. 300 This has two consequences: First, as heir to abusive
regimes, transitional governments have no more moral authority to punish
based on international law than natural law. Second, abusers living under
an abusive public face of law, because they are insulated from the body of
threats maintained by the international community, are not subject to the
fair warning required by legality. Absent the coherent, clear warning
demanded by legality, members of the international community have no
better claim to punish crimes against humanity. That the failure is the
regime's, rather than the international community's, is unimportant with
respect to the autonomy of prospective defendants.
Leaders are situated differently. Rather than living under an abusive
public face of law, high-level leaders have a duty to conform domestic law
to the demands of natural right and to the core demands of international
human rights law. 30 1 While failing to fulfill this duty does not give rise to
individual criminal liability, 30 2 recognition of this institutional role points

out the unique position of high-level leaders. As opposed to their subjects,
leaders are exposed directly to the international community. They may not
claim ignorance of or insulation from threats of punishment posed by
prosecutions for crimes against humanity. That the vast majority of these
prosecutions have focused on high-level leaders 30 3 strengthens the threat,
and the point. So, while the historical fact of prosecutions for crimes
against humanity does not solve legality concerns with respect to those
living under an abusive regime it does provide ample authority for
prosecuting high-level leaders who use their positions of authority to
construct and preserve a public face of law that encourages crimes against
304
humanity.

300. This point is argued at greater length in Part IV.
301. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 26-27, May 23, 1969, S. Exec. Doc.
L. 92-1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") art. 2(2), Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E. 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173-74;
Genocide Convention, supra note 149, art. 5, 102 Stat. at 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280.
302. Heads of state and governments, collectively, may, however, be prosecuted for
criminal acts. See generally E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2003).
303. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2602-03.
304. This is an established ground for criminal liability in contemporary international
criminal jurisprudence. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 150,
art. 7,2187 U.N.T.S. at 93-94.
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Jus cogens and international treaties face similar limitations, derived
from externality 30 5 and the intervention of domestic law. In addition, they
face significant jurisprudential problems. Jus cogens, "norm[s] accepted
and recognized by the international community of States," 30 6 for example,
are only enforceable by states against other states and do not provide
grounds for individual criminal liability. 30 7 The few international treaties
that provide grounds for individual liability usually require domestic
execution. While it is argued that some treaties are not so limited, 30 8 this is
a contested view, 309 diffusing any clear warning that the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, for example, might
provide for those living within the dense folds of an abusive regime.
Regardless, like domestic laws against murder, even self-executing treaties
are obscured in pre-transitional regimes by an abusive public face of law.
By contrast, high-level leaders in abusive regimes have good reason to
question their commitments to death and destruction. Since 1948 most
countries, including most abusive regimes, have made formal commitments
to refrain from atrocities by becoming parties to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and other treaties and conventions. 3 10 In addition to these
documents, leaders have become regular targets for prosecutions based on
transgressions of international law. 3 11 These commitments and events
provide the elite with adequate warning that they may be subjected to
prosecution under international law. This warning, unique to the normative
and phenomenal positions of high-level leaders, resolves legality concerns,
which counsel against prosecutions directed against those who live under an
abusive public face of law.
The significance of the distinction between subjects and sovereigns is
amplified by abusive regimes' frequently autocratic nature. There are
relatively few people in influential decision-making roles responsible for
advancing institutional programs of abuse. 3 12 Moreover, those most
responsible are often identifiable by the fact that they have authored and
executed the key elements of an abusive public face of law. 313 Having done
305. Sriram, supra note 297, at 313-23, 374-400.
306. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 301, art. 53, S. Exec. Doc. E
95-2 at 24, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus
Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 63.
307. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 (1987);
Randall, supra note 298, at 787-88.
308. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2553.
309. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, in
International Criminal Law 3, 10, 16 (Gerhard 0. W. Mueller & Edward M. Wise eds.,
1965).
310. A list of these treaties with updated lists of their signatories and parties is available
General,
with
the
Secretary
Treaties
Deposited
at
Multilateral
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/bible.asp (last visited Mar. 21,
2006).
311. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza & Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T,
5-10 (Dec. 3, 2003).
Judgment & Sentence,
312. Orentlicher, SettlingAccounts, supra note 2, at 2601-03.
313. See id.
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so, leaders in these positions cannot use as a shield the sword that they have
forged.
IV. DEFENDING THE DEFENSE PART Two: CONSEQUENTIALIST
RESPONSES AND LEGALITY

Until now this Article has focused on deontological issues. This
discussion has largely ignored approaches to the problem of just
punishment that focus not on abstract principles but on the achievement of
social goals, such as prevention of crime. In this consequentialist world it
might be argued that the principle of legality can and should be rejected or
3 14
modified if it interferes with the efficient achievement of these goals.
This part argues that these concerns suggest a program of limited
prosecutions focused on high-level leaders.
3 15
Consequentialist approaches to criminal punishment are goal-oriented.
For the most part they are, as Professor Nigel Walker puts it, reductive:
They seek to reduce crime. There are, in the traditional literature, five main
services that trials and punishment provide to this end:
1. Deterring the offender with painful memory of prior punishment

2. Deterring others by using the punished as an example
3. Reforming the offender so that she is less inclined to commit crimes
4. Educating the offender and the public to take a more serious view of

the criminal act
3 16
5. Protecting the public by incapacitating the offender

These justifications are replicated in transitional justice debates. For
example, Professor Douglass Cassel defends domestic and international
criminal trials to deter potential human rights violators. 3 17 Others argue
that trials carry transition forward, 3 18 demonstrate public commitments to
democracy and the rule of law3 19 and thereby prevent further human rights
abuses. 320 In addition, incapacitation may justify punishment to prevent
future abuses or counterrevolution.
The sections below argue that consequentialist goals of incapacitation
and deterrence do not support the use of criminal trials in transitions, at
314. I am in debt to Richard Kraut for his vigorous pursuit of this critical line.
315. Plato, Protagoras *324a-b (C.C.W. Taylor, trans., Clarendon Press 1976).
316. Nigel Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice
26-27 (1980).
317. Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., International Truth Commissions and Justice, in I
Transitional Justice, supra note 25; Cassel, supra note 215, at 197-98; see also Orentlicher,
Settling Accounts, supranote 2, at 2542.
318. Teitel, supranote 16, at 11-67, 213-28; Ruti Teitel, TransitionalJurisprudence: The
Role of Law in PoliticalTransformation, 106 Yale L. J. 2009 (1997).
319. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2542.
320. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searchingfor Peace andAchieving Justice: The Need for
Accountability, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 9, 18-22.
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least for those who qualify for the proposed affirmative defense. Remote
threats of punishment are unlikely to deter most pre-transitional abusers,
who live under the immediate control of an abusive regime and an abusive
public face of law. 32 1 Further, given shifts in law occasioned by transition,
most pre-transitional abusers are best treated as candidates for change. For
those who are not, transitional regimes have authority to punish posttransitional crimes. Consistent with Part II, this part argues that high-level
leaders and others with direct exposure to the international community may
be punished to deter those in similar positions in other abusive regimes.
Though I continue to argue against broad prosecutions, I leave room for
procedural approaches that focus on reform and rehabilitation by arguing
that most pre-transitional "offenders" are candidates for participation in the
Pursuit of reform and
broader reforms that constitute transitions.
reintegration come at the price of withdrawing the threat of punishment in
most cases, however. The part concludes that, by coordinating limited trials
and truth-seeking procedures, it is possible to avoid most of the dangers of
uncritical, de facto amnesties while securing efficiently the transitional
benefits that advocates hope to achieve through criminal trials and
punishment.
A. DeterringFuture Human Rights Abuses
Deterrence theories focus on the decision-making processes of
prospective criminals. 322 Transitional trials motivated by deterrence
attempt to create an environment in which the balance of threatened
323
punishment and provisional benefits tilts firmly against abuses.
Transitional trials may also hope to deter by publicizing the facts of past
325
abuses, 324 lifting the veil of secrecy upon which abusers frequently rely.
Finally, trials may hope to deter other potential human rights abusers
abroad. 326 The deterrent effect of truth and punishment on the international
scene is a central argument in favor of an international criminal court and
327
for international jurisdiction.

321. Kant, supra note 283, at *236-38; Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67.
322. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1963); Johannes Andenaes, The
GeneralPreventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 949 (1966).
323. Cassel, supra note 215, at 215-17; Jaime Malamud-Goti, TransitionalGovernments
in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 1, 8-10 (1990). Professor
Jaime Malamud-Goti rejects this strategy in Game Without End: State Terror and the
Politics ofJustice, supra note 29.
324. Cassel, supra note 317, at 78.
325. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 662.

326. This was an argument made in favor of prosecuting Augusto Pinochet. See Loma
McGregor, Military and Judicial Intervention: The Way Forward in Human Rights
Enforcement?, 12 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 107, 117 (2001); Amnesty Int'l, United
Kingdom: The Pinochet Case-UniversalJurisdictionandAbsence of Immunity for Crimes
Against Humanity, Al Index EUR 45/01/99, 20, Jan. 1, 1999 (listing trials in France,
Switzerland, Belgium, and Spain).
327. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2542-43.
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This section makes two main arguments against transitional trials as a
deterrent strategy.
First, criminal prosecutions are theoretically and
practically unlikely to provide significant deterrent effect against future
institutionalized human rights abuses. 328 Second, to the extent future
abuses can be deterred, transition itself, including shifts in social norms and
public threats, provides sufficient threat to prevent future abuses. The force
of this argument is derived from the contention that deterrence
justifications, though initially appealing, fail to take account of pretransitional conditions, the places of individual abusers in pre-transitional
states, and the impact that transitions themselves may be expected to have
on victims and abusers.
Jeremy Bentham described the concept behind deterrence theory, often
called the "classic school" of criminology, thusly:
Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man
perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted
upon in such a manner as tends, with a certain force, to draw him, as it
were, from the commission of that act. If the apparent magnitude, or
rather value, of the pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value
of the pleasure or good he expects to be the consequence of the act, he
will be absolutely prevented from performing it. The mischief which
would have ensued from the act, if performed, will also by that means be
329
prevented.
The concept is not difficult to grasp. If the consequences of an action are
more bad than good for an agent, then she will refrain. Deterrence as a
justification of and goal for public policy is somewhat more complex, of
course. Bentham's formula simplifies the conditions in which crimes are
committed, and the subjective positions of criminals. 330 It presumes that
potential criminals are rational utility maximizers. 33 1 It also assumes a
single, identifiable, and univocal punitive authority.332 It further assumes
that the authority's demands can be and are clearly communicated to
agents. 3 33 Finally, it simplifies the concept of "consequences," which is
quite complicated, involving calculations of severity, risk of detection, and
probability of punishment after detection. 334 All of these considerations
make the deterrence thesis much more complex than it first appears. To
measure the potential of criminal trials in transitions to prevent future
abuses of human rights it is necessary to expose and investigate these
complexities.
328. Aukerman, supranote 4, at 66-67.
329. Introduction,supranote 197, at 396.
330. Nigel Walker, Why Punish? 13-18 (1991).
331. Principles,supranote 197.

332. T. Mathiesen, General Prevention as Communication, in A Reader on Punishment
221, 231 (R.A. Duff& David Garland eds., 1994).
333. See id. at 321-22.
334. Aukerman, supra note 4, at 64. In formulaic terms: deterrence = severity of
consequence x (risk of detection x risk of conviction). I am in debt to Judge Richard Posner
for deriving this formula.
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Deterrence theory makes law and criminal punishment a strategic game
between rational agents disposed to maximize the possibility of benefit and
minimize the risk of harm. 33 5 The game leaves open the question of
players' identities, however. In transitions the subjective conditions that
affect participation in deterrence games are more numerous and the possible
identities of players more diverse than in stable states. 336 Deterrence
advocates usually fail to take proper account of these added complexities.
Yet it is essential to be clear about who is deterring whom to understand the
dynamic relationships in the game. 3 37 Absent this, the hopeful claims of
deterrence are too abstract to justify criminal punishment in transitions
given the significant costs of trials in respect of other transitional goals.
B. A Three-DimensionalAnalysis of Deterrencein Transitions
This section describes a three-dimensional model of deterrence in
transitions, taking account of those who might be deterred, their subjective
motivations, and the source of deterrent threats. The next section argues,
based on this model, that only high-level leaders provide reasonable objects
for deterrence in transitions.
1. The First Dimension: Objects of Deterrence
In traditional deterrence theory, punishment is designed to have either an
individual or a general deterrent effect. 338 In the former, punishment tries
to imprint the cost of crime on the criminal herself, using her memory of the
punishment to deter her from committing future crimes. 33 9 General
deterrence hopes that public punishment of criminals will put fear in the
hearts of others and thereby prevent them from breaking the law.340 In
transitions, advocates also justify punishment as a tool for preventing
counterrevolutions 34 1 by marking a change in the public face of law,
deterring those who oppose transition. 342 Punishment also aspires to create
343
an environment of accountability where before there was impunity.

335. See generally Becker, supra note 197, at 169; Introduction,supranote 197, at 86-91;
Principles,supra note 197, at 365; Posner, supra note 197.
336. See Jon Elster, Coming to Terms with the Past: A Framework for the Study of
Justice in the Transition to Democracy, 39 Europdennes de Sociologie 7, 37 (1998) (Fr.).
337. See J.Q. Wilson, Penalties and Opportunities, in A Reader on Punishment, supra
note 332, at 177, 187.
338. Johs Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. Crim. L.,
Criminology & Police Sci. 176 (1952); Andenaes, supra note 322, at 949.
339. N. Walker, Reductivism and Deterrence, in A Reader on Punishment, supra note
332, at 212.
340. For a vivid account of this theory in action see Foucault's description of the drawing
and quartering of a "regicidaire" in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1979). The theme of deterrence by raw fear and spectacle is repeated in
more detail in "The Spectacle of the Scaffold." Foucault, supra, at 128.
341. See also Aukerman, supra note 4, at 65.
342. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2542.
343. Id.
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Individual transitions to democracy are not isolated. They are part of
broader efforts to establish and extend a human rights culture. 344 Punishing
in a particular transition may, then, have a "super-general" deterrent effect,
discouraging current or prospective abusers in other states. 345 Of course, to
make the case for punishment on the basis of a "super-general" deterrence
effect there must be compelling reason to believe that a domestic spectacle
will reach across lines of history, culture, and nationality. If this hope is too
thin then advocates must accept limitations on trials derived from other
practical and moral considerations.
2. The Second Dimension: Sources of Deterrence
Transitions leave open the question of who should take responsibility for
creating the deterrent threat. 346 In stable states the answer is obvious: The
right of punishment is reserved for a sovereign authority. 347 In transitions
the candidates are more numerous, including an outgoing government, a
provisional government or successor regime, the United Nations, regional
transnational organizations, 34 8 special tribunals, and a permanent
international criminal court. More recently, third party states have also
made efforts to conduct trials. Spain's attempt to extradite Augusto
Pinochet on charges of crimes against humanity is, perhaps, the most
notorious; 349 but Belgium was the first to enjoy contemporary success in
these endeavors, when, in 2001, several individuals connected to the 1994
3 50
Rwandan massacre were convicted in Belgian courts.
These possibilities suggest nine model cases that deterrence advocates
might have in mind when they call for trials in transitions:
1. Domestic enforcement agents use punishment of individual
abusers to deter those same abusers from committing future abuses.
2. International and transnational agents use punishment of
individual abusers to deter those same abusers from committing
future abuses.

344. Rorty, supra note 17, at 115.
345. Cassel, supra note 215, at 205-15; see also Jennifer L. Balint, The Place of Law in
Addressing InternalRegime Conflicts, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 103.
346. There are, of course, related questions as to who has the authority to carry out or
demand trials in a particular transition. These questions are beyond the immediate scope of
the present discussion.
347. Kant, supranote 283, at *331-32.
348. The Organization for African Unity, for example, has a permanent human rights
enforcement arm, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, though it lacks
formal enforcement power. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 45,
adoptedJune 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
349. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 326, for both a description of the case and a normative
argument for the prosecution.
350. Marlise Simons, An Awful Task: Assessing 4 Roles in Death of Thousands, N.Y.

Times, Apr. 30, 2001, at A3.
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3. Foreign governments use punishment of individual abusers to
deter those same abusers from committing future abuses.
4. Domestic enforcement agents use punishment to deter generally
future abusers in the domestic sphere. 351
5. International and transnational agents use punishment to deter
generally future abusers in the domestic sphere.
6. Foreign governments use punishment to deter generally future
abusers in the domestic sphere.
7. Domestic enforcement agents use punishment to deter generally
present and future abusers in the international sphere.
8. International and transnational agents use punishment to deter
generally present and future abusers in the international sphere.
9. Foreign governments use punishment to deter generally present
and future abusers in the international sphere.
Punishing agents need not confine themselves to one object population.
The International Criminal Court, for example, might hope to deter specific
domestic agents, the general domestic population, and the general
population in other nations. Neither is it necessary that one agency take
responsibility for trying and punishing all candidates for justice. 352 The
categories are not exclusive.
3. The Third Dimension: Subjective Dispositions of Those Deterred
Though they add some depth to an understanding of punitive
relationships in transitions, these nine models leave out the most significant
dimension of analysis.
Abusers are not faceless agents who have
indistinguishable attitudes and occupy identical positions. Abusive regimes
present a broad spectrum of abusers, running from dedicated leaders, to
enthusiastic followers, to those who abuse only to save themselves. It is
worth distinguishing five groups in particular:

351. By "domestic sphere," I mean the political and physical world within the sovereign
control of a transitioning state.
352. The possibility of multiple agencies conducting trials raises unique equitable and
procedural concerns. See Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan National Justice
System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. Int'l L.J. 163 (2000) (providing
a comparative analysis of the ICTR and Rwandan domestic trials and documenting
procedural and substantive abuses in the latter); Amnesty Int'l, Rwanda: Unfair Trials:
Justice Denied,Al Index AFR 47/08/97, Apr. 8, 1997 (documenting due process and human
rights concerns at all levels of the domestic trial process in Rwanda).
While not
insurmountable, these additional worries must be part of the calculus.
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1. Leaders motivated by deep political or ethical convictions tied to
353
an institutionalized worldview.
354
2. Leaders motivated by personal interest and ambition.

3. Followers motivated by deep political
or ethical convictions tied
355
to an institutionalized worldview.
4. Followers motivated by personal interest or ambition who take
356
advantage of conditions under the abusive regime (opportunists).
5. Abusers motivated by physical or social pressures,
including
357
threats of harm and pressure from peers to conform.
The primary reason for adding this dimension is to point out that abusers
have different orientations to abuse. Deterrence theorists often are accused
358
of falsely presuming that criminals are no more than interest calculators.
While this objection is overstated, the underlying point, that the position
and orientation of actors is a factor in their relation to crime and deterrent
3 59
threats, is significant.
With this three-dimensional model in view the next sections argue that
most individuals who commit human rights abuses are unlikely to be
reached by general deterrence strategies, with the exception of leaders
directly exposed to the international sphere. For most others, punishment
353. This is how Daniel Jonah Goldhagen wants his readers to think of the perpetrators of
the Holocaust who were "Germans first." Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 6-7. Hitler would
certainly fit this category, as would Stalin and some Hutu Power leaders in Rwanda.
354. This category is designed to encompass individuals who participate in abuse to
advance their careers, and individuals who take advantage of the vulnerability of victims to
achieve more immediate personal and material goals. Leader of the Revolutionary United
Front in Sierra Leone, Foday Sankoh, and former Liberian President Charles Taylor are
examples of those who might fall within this category.
355. This category is designed to encompass true believers, such as members of the
Rwandan interahamwe, members of the East German Stazi, junta followers in Argentina,
and members of the German SS.
356. Elster, supra note 21, at 110-11. This includes Germans and Lithuanians who
participated in the maintenance and cleansing of the ghettos, art collectors who purchased
works taken from Jews during the Holocaust, industrialists who took advantage of slave
labor, and international financial institutions that profit from abuses.
357. Examples of this category are common in Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, and Rwanda,
where direct threats to personal safety and family were common tools used to recruit and
retain abusers. This category also includes those affected by the upside-down world of
praise and blame that characterizes abusive regimes. See, e.g., Malamud-Goti, supra note 29
(discussing the role that institutional praise for human rights abuses that characterized
military culture in Argentina during the 1970s and early 1980s played).
358. James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime 118-21 (2d ed. 1983).
359. See generally Wilson, supra note 337 (arguing that most criminals, particularly
repeat offenders and "career criminals," are rational in their decision making). Professor
James Q. Wilson also points out that criminals' decisions may appear irrational to lawabiding citizens, but that this is due to a disparity in information about the real risks of crime.
Law-abiding citizens tend to inflate the risks of being caught and punished. Id. For a more
general survey of literature on the rationality of criminals, see David J. Pyle, The Economics
of Crime and Law Enforcement 29-62 (1983) (describing econometric studies).

2006]

AN EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH

2669

does not promise a significant benefit beyond the preventive and deterrent
effects of transitional changes to the public face of law. Together these
arguments lead to a vision of limited trials that is consistent with the
excuse-centered approach advanced in Part II.
C. The LimitedProspects of GeneralDeterrencefrom TransitionalTrials
Deterrence is forward looking, designed to inhibit persons from
choosing 360 criminal activity in the future by imposing costs on criminal
activity sufficient to outweigh benefits. 3 6 1 Deterrence presumes that
criminals make rational cost-benefit choices. 362 This general conception of
agency has some currency in common sense and in jurisprudential theories
advanced by eminent philosophers from Bentham 363 through philosopher
Cesare Beccaria, 364 philosopher John Stuart Mill, 365 Holmes, 3 66 and
Hart,3 67 to contemporary proponents of rational choice theory 3 68 and law
and economics. 369 Intuitively it seems that we are inclined to do that which
benefits us and disinclined to do that which does not.370 Even granting this,
however, it does not follow that everyone works this way in all
circumstances.
One common critique of the deterrence theorist's model of agency is that
it fails to take account of crimes of passion. 37 1 Crimes of passion pose a
problem for deterrence in two ways. First, passionate criminals do not act
out of a fully rational state and are unlikely to be swayed by remote threats
of deterrence. 372 Thus, policies focused on general deterrence are unlikely

360. One of the most common arguments against capital punishment as a deterrent
contends that most murderers do not, in fact, act reasonably. See, e.g., David A. Conway,
Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations in Dialogue Form, in
Punishment 261, 264-65 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995).
361. Posner, supra note 197, at 1205-14.
362. I do not want to commit myself to the view that instrumental reason is the only
function of our rational faculties. Kant, among many others, has argued, quite persuasively,
that we have facilities for practical as well as instrumental reason. Kant, supra note 283, at
*211-14. For the present, however, I am staying on consequentialist ground.
363. Introduction,supra note 197, at 86; Principles,supra note 197, at 365.
364. Beccaria, supra note 322.
365. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 59 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1989)
(1859); John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (William Benton ed., Encyclopaedia Britannica
1989) (1861) [hereinafter Mill, Utilitarianism].
366. Holmes, supra note 248, at 34-62.
367. Hart, supra note 155; Hart, supra note 198; Hart, supranote 141, at 593.
368. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 5 (1957); Jon Elster, Rational
Choice 1 (1986).
369. Pyle, supra note 359, at 29-62; Posner, supra note 197, at 1193.
370. Mill, Utilitarianism, supra note 365, at 445-46.
371. Primoratz, supra note 195, at 38.
372. See Walker, supra note 330, at 16; Andrew Ashworth, Deterrence, in Principled
Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 44, 50 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew
Ashworth eds., 1998). But see Posner, supra note 197, at 1223. Posner argues that crimes of
passion should be more severely punished to overcome strong temptation-this response
misses the point, of course, which is that threats of punishment, no matter how severe, are

2670

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

to reduce crimes of passion. Second, passionate criminals, and particularly
murderers, are unlikely to repeat their crimes, so punishment serves no
373
individual deterrent purpose.
In pre-transitions, "true believers," committed to the ethical, political,
and cosmological visions constitutive of an abusive public face of law,
commit most atrocities 374 and do so with the most enthusiasm. 375 The fact
that many pre-transitional acts reflect passionate commitments raises
serious concerns for the prospects of deterrence in abusive regimes. 376 Like
passionate criminals, true believers caught up in the fervor of mass violence
are unlikely to be affected by remote threats, particularly when the
prevailing public face of law supports the view that what they do is
377
necessary and right.
Not all crimes are crimes of passion, of course. One might wonder why,
then, the presence of laws and law enforcement do not deter all criminals in
stable states. One possibility is that criminals are "broken," or at least
significantly enough unlike the rest of us to act like they are. 378 In cases of
those with psychopathological and socio-pathological tendencies this may
be true, at least to some degree. 3 79 But even sociopaths have sufficient
interest in their own pain and pleasure to allow decision making consistent
with the vision of rational agency critical to deterrence. 380 The same can be
said of many, if not most, perpetrators of large-scale human rights abuses.
Referring to the model outlined above, true believers, opportunists,
careerists, and even those under physical or psychological duress, all make
rational choices, though we may fail to fathom their logic. 3 81 There is,
then, promise that threats of punishment might tip the scales.
One might also speculate that criminals are different from law-abiding
citizens in ways that inoculate them against the deterrent forces of criminal
law. For example, noncriminals are predominately more risk averse than
criminals, and are apt to inflate or take more seriously threats of
punishment. 382 Noncriminals are also more concerned with public stigma

not sufficiently present in the minds of passionate offenders to produce deterrent effects. As
Posner notes, these concerns do not diminish incapacitation justifications. Id.
373. Packer, supra note 138, at 52-53.
374. See Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-16.
375. Id.; see also Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 49-163 (arguing that the pervasive antiSemitic culture that prevailed in Germany during the period leading up to the Holocaust
provided Adolf Hitler with "willing executioners.")
376. Aukerman, supra note 4, at 68-69.
377. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why PerpetratorsShould Not Always Be Prosecuted:
Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions Meet, 49 Emory L.J. 205,

210 (2000); Sriram, supra note 297, at 394.
378. Wilson, supra note 337, at 177-78.
379. Posner, supra note 197, at 1223-25 (arguing that under a deterrence view, insanity
defenses should be limited to a limited class of "undeterrables").
380. Id.
381. See generally Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 164-202; Rorty, supra note 17, at 112-

15.
382. See generally Posner, supranote 197, at 1193; Wilson, supra note 337, at 189.
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and personal guilt than are many criminals. 383 Again, that this may be so
does not require wholesale rejection of deterrence theory. To the contrary,
it proves the broad success of deterrence. Without any threat, more people
might be criminals. 384 Law breakers and recidivists may simply have a
higher deterrence threshold or they may not be in a position to appreciate
deterrent threats. Either way, the fact of crime does little to disprove the
deterrent effect. Even the most criminally inclined are unlikely to commit a
crime if they know they will be caught and punished. This discussion has
interesting consequences for deterrence in transitions.
Many pre-transitional abuses are perpetrated by true believers who act
from conviction. 385 True believers do not weigh threats of punishment in
the same way as stable state criminals. They are motivated not by the
prospect of immediate gain, but by a desire to bring about a specific vision
of the world as it ought to be. 386 These are goals worth killing and dying
for. A remote threat of criminal sanction is unlikely to be weighed
conclusively in the mind of such agents. In fact, rather than deterring,
policies of punishment, whether international or domestic, often strengthen
the commitments of true believers, deepening the damaging effects of the
387
oppositional logic that sustains abusive regimes.
Of course, true believers are not the only perpetrators of pre-transitional
abuse. There are those who abuse under physical, psychological, or social
duress. 3 88 These agents, though more risk averse than true believers,
already are acting out of a risk assessment that reasonably and predictably
puts a priority on present and immediate threats over remote threats of
possible future punishment. In general, agents who act under duress are
389
unlikely to be deterred by exogenous threats of future punishment.
Abusers who act out of ambition or purely private motives may be more
likely to feel the threat of deterrence. Corporate agents and businesses are a
good example of risk-averse groups that may take a longer view of their
actions in abusive regimes. 390 The threat of future sanction might provide
sufficient threat to deter generally opportunists if they have significant
exposure to the international community and the threats posed by domestic
and international prosecutions. 39 1
High-level leaders, international
383. Wilson, supra note 358, at 28-29 (describing the effects of social standards on lawabiding citizens).
384. This point is often made in the context of debates about the death penalty. See, e.g.,
Conway, supra note 360, at 264-65.
385. Elster, supranote 21, at 139; Rorty, supranote 17, at 112-16.
386. See Elster, supra note 21, at 139 (discussing Heinrich Himmler's preference for
"fanatics," who were not motivated by desire for personal benefits).
387. Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 83-91; see also Elster, supranote 21, at 93.

388. Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 96, 249; Minow, supra note 36, at 35-36; Happold,
supra note 87, at 1163.
389. Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67.
390. Cf Levmore, supra note 171, at 1657 (discussing conventional views and values of
certainty and reliance that are hostile to explicitly restorative laws).
391. One might hope that banks, for example, will be less likely to support abusive states
after recent lawsuits brought against Swiss banks by holocaust victims. See Elizabeth J.
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corporations, and international financial institutions provide the most
3 92
promising targets.
The same is not obviously true of domestic agents living under an
abusive public face of law. They have a narrower view of the world,
limited to the reality projected by an abusive regime. Remote future threats
are unlikely to dissuade most such agents. More importantly, these are
individuals best viewed as candidates for change. Those who are not will
identify themselves by attempting new crimes, solving selectivity problems,
and avoiding legality concerns.
D. Identification Concerns and the Limited Prospects of General
Deterrence
The receptiveness of potential abusers does not determine entirely the
effectiveness of deterrence, of course. General deterrence is a function of
how present threats are in the minds of those living in abusive regimes.
Certainty, not severity, is the engine of deterrence. 3 93 Without sufficient
risk of detection and conviction, even the most severe punishment will fail
to deter. In light of the unique conditions of abusive regimes, threats of
punishment are too ephemeral, distant, and temporally remote to provide
the degree of certainty necessary to offset motivations provided by an
abusive public face of law.
To be deterred, prospective abusers must identify with those punished. If
they can distinguish themselves and their situations then they are unlikely to
feel the threat of punishment and, thus, unlikely to restrain themselves out
of fear. 394 The three-dimensional model of abusers described above
indicates that punishing abusers from one category will fail to provide a
general deterrent effect across categorical lines. For example, there is no
reason to think that punishing leaders and intellectual architects will deter
on-the-ground abusers. 395 Likewise, punishing active abusers is unlikely to
deter passive opportunists.
The problems presented by deterring across classes are common to all
categories identified above.
Whether the punishing authority is a
transitional regime, an international organization, or a foreign state,
potential abusers will not feel threatened by punishments applied to
characters playing different roles. To the contrary, those who might feel
some empathetic connection to former Serbian president Slobodan

Cabreser, Human Rights Violations as Mass Torts: Compensation as a Proxyfor Justice in
the United States Civil Litigation System, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2211, 2237-38 (2004). But see
Saul Levnore, Speculating Law: Beyond Cigarettesand Swiss Banks, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 639,

647-48 (2001) (noting that disgorgement may not discourage future bad behavior).
392. See Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 10 (stating that legal disincentives to commit
crimes are likely to be effective only against high-level leaders in the military).
393. Beccaria, supra note 322, at 68; Andenaes, supra note 322, at 949 (citing studies
throughout the article).
394. Malamud-Goti, supranote 29, at 9-10.
395. See id. at 10; Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67.
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Milosevic, say, would more likely be motivated to reduce their apparent
responsibility by creating a shield of plausible deniability or by spreading
responsibility 396 than to refrain from pursuing ideologically motivated
programs of abuse.

397

Taking account of these concerns seems to argue in favor of broader,
more inclusive, prosecutorial strategies that capture the attention of all
prospective abusers. As is pointed out above, however, it is simply
impossible for transitions to prosecute everyone who has had a hand in pretransitional abuses. Some selections must be made. To both meet this
constraint and avoid the difficulties of cross-class deterrence a transition
might elect to prosecute representatives from each category. 398 While this
inverted class action approach has some immediate appeal, it fails to
address certainty concerns. The "cross-class" problem points out that
transitional trials and punishments cannot provide substantial certainty of
punishment. Total immunity of a class of bad actors fails utterly to deter
because it leaves members of that class certain that they will not be
punished. Symbolic punishment of a few members of a class that may
number in the millions fails to deter because it does not provide the
3 99
necessary degree of certainty.
Unlike cross-class concerns, risk problems derived from intra-class
selectivity do not affect all abuser categories equally. Selectivity concerns
counsel against picking punitive projects that cannot be completed. 400 By
contrast, projects that can be completed may provide sufficient promise of
deterring those similarly situated in other regimes. 40 1 These considerations
recommend prosecutions focused on high-level leaders. 40 2
Leaders
comprise a group sufficiently small to allow complete, and therefore
effective, deterrence programs. 40 3 Leaders exposed to the international
sphere also have more perfect information, enhancing their subjective
exposure to threats from international trials. Programs that focus on top
leaders therefore provide real hope of creating productive individual and
general deterrence effects, particularly if pursued through persistent
40 4
international enforcement regimes.

396. See, e.g., Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 96 ("If everybody is implicated, then
implication becomes meaningless.").
397. This is, in part, due to the unique motivations and subjective positions of pretransitional abusers, and particularly true believers discussed above.
398. I am in debt to van Zyl for sharing with me this argument for "horizontally-limited"
trials.
399. Andenaes, supra note 322, at 960-73 (discussing the coordinated role of severity and
risk in the deterrence effect); Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67.
400. De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81-82.
401. See van Zyl, supra note 5, at 665-66 (discussing the importance, as well as the
difficulties, of prosecuting human rights abuses).
402. Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 8-10.
403. Id.
404. See van Zyl, supra note 5, at 665-66 (discussing the usefulness and the difficulties of
prosecuting military and political leaders).
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E. Proximity Concerns and the Limited Prospects of Deterrence
Ignorance and uncertainty, along with delay and debates about the
rationality of criminals, form the core of stable state contests about
deterrence. 40 5 The foregoing discussion of the subjective orientations of
pre-transitional abusers to their bad acts substantially increases these
concerns in the transitional context. Failures to communicate derived from
isolation and ignorance further diminish the possibility that a general
deterrence effect can affect institutional violence in abusive states.
In stable states legislatures and judges do not have direct lines of
communication with prospective criminals. 40 6 This allows criminals and
potential criminals to discount or misunderstand the possible costs of their
crimes. 40 7 In the transitional context these problems are magnified. If
domestic authorities are conducting trials then deterrent threats postdate
abuses. With respect to past wrongs, then, trials serve no deterrent purpose
at all. If transition itself can prevent future domestic abuses then there is no
reason to conduct domestic trials to deter domestic abuse.
Domestic trials designed to produce a general deterrence effect in other
countries are equally unpromising. Though the threat derived from a
previous transition in country A is prospective with respect to those in
country B, any domestic trials eventually conducted in B still require the
retroactive enforcement of codes and punishments novel to citizens in B.
This natural isolation of abusers limits the hope of using domestic
40 8
prosecutions to communicate clearly with those living in foreign states,
particularly given the fact that a primary tool of abusive regimes is isolation
of its citizens from the international human rights culture and its
members. 4 09 Where leaks occur, citizens of abusive regimes must piece
together inevitably diverse and conflicting interpretations of events in
foreign transitions. 4 10 It is unlikely that these filtered facts and rumor-filled
theories will provide a clear and coherent deterrent threat. 4 1' Thus, there is
little hope that the deterrent message from a transitioning country would be
felt and heard by those living elsewhere.
International authorities or a single nation acting as a global prosecutor
4 12
It
for crimes against humanity might produce a consistent message.
remains uncertain, however, whether residents of abusive regimes can or

405. Wilson, supra note 337, at 178.
406. Mathiesen, supra note 332, at 228-3 1.
407. Id; see also Wilson, supra note 337, at 177-81.

408. Sriram, supra note 297, at 394-95.
409. Aryeh Neier, The Questfor Justice, N.Y. Rev., Mar. 8, 2001, at 31.

410. Id.
411. This isolation may be fortuitous or, as Malamud-Goti argues, an essential part of an
abusive regime's strategy of disarticulating power. See Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at
124-28.
412. Douglass Cassel, Why We Need the International Criminal Court, 116 Christian
Century 532, 533-35 (1999).

2006]

AN EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH

2675

will feel the threat of these foreign prosecutions. 4 13 Mass violence and
institutionalized human rights abuses are a result of the coordinated efforts
of abusive regimes. 4 14 Abusers on the ground may have no clear idea about
what goes on outside their borders. To the extent that they are aware, the
messages sent by international prosecutions are inevitably obfuscated, if not
perverted, by abusive regimes. True believers are particularly vulnerable to
counterclaims on behavior made by an abusive public face of law because
4 15
they are easily convinced of global conspiracies against their causes.
Leaders who are exposed directly to international law do not present
these same structural concerns. Though leaders are often true believers,
they are in a position to have clear evidence that they are vulnerable to
prosecution. We may hope, then, that leaders directly exposed and
responsible to international law can be deterred by prosecutions of those
like them. 4 16 This may be an unrealistic hope given the horrible potentials
of ambition and zealotry 4 17 but at least there is structural promise of
deterrence in these cases. There is little or none with respect to those living
behind the veil of an abusive public face of law.
F. Immediacy and the LimitedProspects of TransitionalDeterrence
Immediacy is central to the effectiveness of general deterrence
strategies. 4 18 Criminals naturally discount threats of punishment that are
too far in the future. 4 19 As argued above, most who commit abuses in pretransitions are unlikely to feel the threat of punishment from international
agents. For those who might feel some external threat, the threat is not
immediate or definite enough to provide a significant deterrent effect given
that immediately present domestic institutions support abuse through, at
least, the public face of law.
420
True believers are unlikely to either respect or fear external threats.
Moreover, their commitments to the normative, ontological, and
teleological systems that justify abuses, in combination with commitments
to abusive regimes, make them comfortable with risk.4 2 1 Domestic
opportunists might be more vulnerable to deterrence, but they too act within
the mediating threat structure of an abusive regime and are more likely to
413. James Blount Griffin, A Predictive Frameworkfor the Effectiveness of International
Criminal Tribunals,34 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 405, 449-53 (2001).

414. The Radio T616vision Libre de Mille Collines ("RTLM") in Rwanda provides a
striking example of the role that public propaganda can play in genocide. The principals in
the RTLM were convicted of genocide and incitement of genocide before the ICTR in 2003.
415. See, e.g., Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 210-11.
416. Cassel, supra note 412, at 534.
417. See Aukerman, supra note 4, at 68.
418. Beccaria, supra note 322, at 55-56.
419. Edmund S. Howe & Cynthia J. Brandau, Additive Effects of Certainty, Severity and
Celerity of Punishment on Judgments of Crime Deterrence Scale Value, 18 J. Applied Soc.
Psychol. 796, 806-09 (1988).
420. See Elster, supra note 336, at 36-38.
421. See id.
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act in accordance with these immediate demands, discounting remote,
4 22
vague, external, and future threats.
Those acting under duress are even less likely to be deterred by the
distant threats of outside agencies. By definition, these individuals are both
risk averse and predisposed not to commit human rights abuses. They
participate in the violence only because of direct and immediate danger to
them or their families. Like opportunists, it is unreasonable to expect them
to expose themselves to immediate harm to avoid distant and remote threats
of punishment.
Immediacy is also a problem for leaders. To feel the force of any
deterrent threat they must imagine that their power is limited and that their
reign will end-and soon. Unfortunately, humility and a healthy sense of
mortal vulnerability are not common characteristics of despots. Zealots and
leaders motivated by ambition are unlikely to modify their behavior by
looking toward the day when they will have fallen from power. While this
concern is real enough, it is not a structural problem. The worry is
essentially the same as the more general concern that criminals are hard to
deter because they do not commit their crimes expecting to be caught. 4 23 In
theory, then, an international enforcement regime could provide sufficient
risk of punishment for leaders directly exposed to international law.
G. TransitionsDeter FutureDomestic Abuses
As with all policies justified by a balancing of consequences, punishment
as deterrence must provide more benefit than harm. 424 Trials present real
risks of harm to transitions and transitional goals of peace, stability, and the
rule of law. 425 These risks are justified only if there is no less-costly way to
prevent future abuses. 4 26 Trials, with the exception of trials focused on
high-level leaders, do not add significantly to the deterrent effects provided
by transition itself. Taking account of this balance points toward a strategy
of vertically limited trials identical to that proposed in Part II of this Article.
One of the main arguments advanced in this Article is that human rights
abuses on a scale that calls for transitional justice are a function of abusive
cultures and systems of institutionalized violence. Absent a pervasive and
42 7
institutionalized anti-Semitism, the Holocaust would not have happened.
422. See Aukerman, supra note 4, at 67; cf Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 10-12
(pointing out that the density of social, institutional, and peer pressure is greater for
underlings than for high-level leaders).
423. David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the
Pickpocket's Hanging, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 295, 308 (2002) (discussing a variety of
psychological dispositions that limit the effectiveness of deterrence).
424. Jamal Benomar, Justice After Transitions, in Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at

32,41.
425. See
426. See
the Legacy
149.
427. See

Malamud-Goti, supranote 29, at 4-5.
Ruti Teitel, How Are the New Democracies of the Southern Cone Dealing with
of Past Human Rights Abuses?, in Transitional Justice, supra note 25, at 146,
Goldhagen, supranote 17, at 27-178.
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Absent widespread commitments to a "Hamitic myth," supported by public
institutions, there would have been no slaughter in Rwanda.4 28 Without a
war on communism, accompanying beliefs about the pernicious communist
threat, and an institutional reliance on the military there would have been no
"Dirty War" in Argentina. 42 9 This suggests a simple objection to deterrence
in transitions.
If large-scale human rights abuses are, in part, a function of extraordinary
historical, political, legal, and cultural circumstances that create unique
incentive structures; 4 30 and if transitions, by their nature, mark a shift in
these conditions; then transitions may expect that there will be an
accompanying shift in citizens' public behavior post-transition. 4 31
For
those whose actions were a function of conditions in the past regime,
shifting conditions in transition prevent future abuses by removing
motivation, justification, and opportunity. Given transitional shifts in the
public face of law, punishment does not provide additional benefit with
respect to preventing future abuses. 432 This is true individually and
generally.
Prompt and certain prosecutions of post-transitional bad actors will serve
notice of a new regime's authority and its commitment to securing human
rights. It will also heighten transitional notice, targeting deterrent threats at
those who are contemplating future abuses. Retroactive punishment of pretransitional crimes does not necessarily communicate the objective and
direction of the new state's deterrent will, 433 nor would it be narrowly
targeted to the audience most in need. Moreover, retrospective trials would
draw on limited police and judicial resources, limiting the capacity of a new
regime to deal with new offenses quickly and consistently. 434 The purposes
of prospective deterrence are best served by punishing post-transitional
offenses rather than reaching into the past.
Some argue that criminal review of past wrongs could make these
deterrent threats more convincing. 435 To the extent that this is so, it does
not require conducting more prosecutions than are recommended by the
proposed excuse. Punishing high-level leaders would serve as sufficient
demonstration of a new regime's commitment to protect rights. Selective
punishment of others would serve no additional good. The better course is
to focus on truth commissions and other procedures designed to capitalize
436
on the transitional potential of former abusers.
428. See Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 47-84.
429. Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 2-70.
430. See Goldhagen, supra note 17, at 21.
431. See Aukerman, supra note 4, at 70-71 (arguing that changing personal beliefs and
social norms provides better hope of preventing crime).
432. Teitel, supra note 16, at 146.
433. For example, these efforts, as I argued above, may be seen as arbitrary, vengeful, or
purely political.
434. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 72; see van Zyl, supra note 5, at 652.
435. Minow, supra note 36, at 50-51.
436. Villa-Vicencio, supra note 377, at 209-15.
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H. Transitions Obviate the Needfor Incapacitation
A transitional regime might justify incarceration for the practical purpose
of incapacitation. 4 37 On closer examination, however, the need for
incapacitation and the balance of its costs and benefits suggests limiting its
application in ways similar to those of deterrence. Incapacitation faces two
main objections in stable states. First, incapacitation presents a moral
problem in that individuals are punished for offenses that they have not yet
committed. 438 Second, incapacitation depends on an ability to predict
accurately who is likely to commit crimes in the future. 4 39 Both these
concerns are salient to transitional justice.
The first objection is primarily moral and, for a consequentialist, is not
difficult to set aside. We deny innocent people their freedom because of the
potential danger they pose to the public when we institute quarantines.
Such policies are warranted in light of necessity and a familiar balance of
harm and benefit. 440 Loss of freedom and compromises against fairness
may be costs in the equation but are not determinative. The same is true of
potential criminals. They pose a risk of harm accruing to society. In
transitions they may even represent a risk of counterrevolution and a return
to the oppressive ways of the past. This seems more than enough danger to
justify incapacitation.
Of course, no society can put everyone in prison.
To justify
incapacitation there must be some way to narrow the numbers. Despite the
popular concerns that incapacitation can justify imprisoning folks with an
extra Y chromosome 44 1 or a history of being abused as children, 44 2 this is
not what is at stake in serious jurisprudence. 44 3 Most incapacitation
literature is only interested in predicting recidivism and criminal
advancement. 44 This is no easy task and even the best models are accurate
only one-third of the time. 445 Using these results as the basis for sentencing
would mean that sixty-six percent of the resources dedicated to
incapacitation strategies would have been wasted. Even if such a low
average could overcome moral objections this is not an acceptable ratio in
resource-starved transitional societies.

437. See Orentlicher, Settling Accounts, supra note 2, at 2542-44.
438. Preface: N. Morris, "'Dangerousness' and Incapacitation," in A Reader on
Punishment, supra note 332, at 238, 238-39.
439. Id.
440. See Posner, supra note 197, at 1214-17.
441. See Cecilee Price-Huish, Born to Kill? "Aggression Genes" and Their Potential
Impact on Sentencing and the CriminalJustice System, 50 SMU L. Rev. 603, 621-22 (1997).
442. John Monahan, Rethinking Risk Assessment 100-01 (2001).

443. Although hardly serious jurisprudence, this is a popular theme in fiction. See, e.g.,
Philip Kerr, A Philosophical Investigation (1992).

444. See Jean Floud & Warren Young, Dangerousness and Criminal Justice (1981); John
Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior: An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (1981).
445. Norval Morris, "Dangerousness"and Incapacitation,in A Reader on Punishment,

supra note 332, at 241, 246-51; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.7 (1983).
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These concerns provide a new perspective on the agency arguments from
Parts I and III of this Article. Incapacitation as a justification for
imprisonment is grounded in a past offense. 446 Most advocates of
incapacitation do not see abstract risk, as a function of genetics, class, race,
or environment, as sufficient to warrant imprisonment. This is, in part, due
to moral concerns, but it also reflects the fact that risk predictions are nearly
useless in noncriminal populations. An overt criminal act is, thus, a
necessary risk factor. 4 47 Guilt is a necessary first step for justifying
incapacitation. 448 This conclusion puts us back on the hook of earlier
concerns about establishing guilt for many abusers from the past regime.
The reader might think that the above argument misses the point slightly.
Former abusers, after all, have done wrong. Whether the overt act is a
"crime" or not is irrelevant next to the fact that it signifies a propensity to
such activities and presents a risk to the new regime. This response fails to
understand the significance of public agency here and in the legality
discussion above.
The consequentialist, to justify incapacitation in
transitions, must rely almost exclusively on past acts that were publicly
accepted, and sometimes expected, as evidence that those who followed the
rules in the past will break them in the future. This requires making the
unwarranted assumption that former abusers will not change their behavior
as the political culture and legal structure of society change. An agentcentered understanding of pre-transitional abuses should lead us to see
many, if not most, former abusers as candidates for change. 449 Presuming,
without further warrant, that they are not eligible for reform raises moral
concerns that also have consequential import.
Given the fact of transition and accompanying shifts in law and public
norms, it seems neither fair nor useful to assume that those who abided by
the public face of law in the past will not do so in the future. Moreover, the
agency focus makes the point that strategies of broad prosecution will
alienate individuals who might be valuable to a transition, provided that
they are not under personal threat if it succeeds. 4 50 Further, incapacitation
policies run the danger of perpetuating pre-transitional divisions, 4 51 making
counterrevolutions more likely, 4 52 and increasing the chances that the
453
transition will ultimately fail to deter future crimes.
This discussion preserves the possibility of punishing high-level leaders.
Leaders have a significant personal and ideological investment in
counterrevolutions. They also have the demonstrated capacity to motivate
large groups of individuals to perpetrate horrific acts. Given these
446.
L. Rev.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

See generally Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the CriminalLaw, 58 Vand.
121 (2005).
Wilson, supra note 358, 145-61.
Id.; Morris, supra note 445, at 247-48.
Villa-Vicencio, supranote 377, at 209.
Id.
Gourevitch, supra note 17, at 95
Ackerman, supra note 6, at 77; Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 26-27, 89.
Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 651-53.
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demonstrated motives and capacities, incapacitation of leaders, through
imprisonment or exile, will frequently be a justifiable transitional cost,
particularly if these leaders have perpetrated overt acts during or after
transition that present a direct threat to peace, stability, or the rule of law.
As a final note on this topic it is worth pointing out a distinction between
the political necessities of transition and legal punishment. Though law and
politics are heavily intertwined, more so in transitions, there is still a
distinction. Transitions are committed to transparency when making
decisions to punish.4 54 If security is the sole justification, that should be
made explicit. If it is for treasonous activity, that should be explicit. If it is
simply a reflection of the transition itself, as lustration might be, 455 then this
should be made explicit. Failure to provide public justifications runs
contrary to transitional commitments to democracy and the rule of law and
456
replicates the disarticulating use of power that defines abusive regimes.
V. THE EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH IN CONTEXT
Transitions cannot, due to practical realities, prosecute all or even most
of those implicated in widespread abuses perpetrated by and under abusive
regimes. 457 This selectivity poses a number of threats to transitional justice
programs. High among these is the hard-to-swallow fact that most of those
involved in past wrongs will not be punished. 458 This apparent failure to
assign responsibility carries with it the morally disturbing implication that
those not punished are not culpable or guilty.4 59 Failures to prosecute also
present the possibility that the truth of what happened in the past will never
be publicly established, 4 60 allowing abusers to carry on without
consequence. Failure to establish a publicly legitimate factual account of
the past also perpetuates injustices against victims by denying them the
acknowledgement they deserve. 46 1 This "oblivion" 462 hampers efforts to
identify causes and consequences of pre-transitional institutions and
464
abuses, 46 3 limiting transitional efforts to carry out effective reform.
Without a publicly legitimate account of the past, transitions may also face
465
revisionism, denial, and counterrevolution.
454. Villa-Vicencio, supra note 377, at 209.
455. Roman Boed, An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool of
TransitionalJustice,37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 357, 359 (1999).
456. Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 19-39.

457. Elster, supra note 21, at 208-15; Hayner, supra note 38, at 12; Minow, supra note
36, at 31, 40-47; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-29; van Zyl, supra note 5, at
661,666.

458. De Greiff, supra note 62, at 94-97.
459. De Greiff, supra note 6, at 82; De Greiff, supra note 62, at 94-97.
460. Hayner, supra note 38, at 12-14.
461. Id.at 28-29; Crocker, supra note 140, at 99, 100-01; Gutmann & Thompson, supra
note 18, at 31.
462. De Greiff, supra note 62, passim.
463. Crocker, supra note 140, at 101-02.
464. Kiss, supra note 23, at 74-79.
465. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 77; Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 26-27.
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These circumstances create tremendous theoretical and practical
challenges for justice in transitions. This Article has sketched a solution to
one of these:
The need to provide guidance and justification for
prosecutorial selection. While this is a valuable contribution to transitional
jurisprudence it does not solve other transitional concerns, particularly
those that flow from the gap between participation in abuses and
prosecution for past wrongs. For example, vertically limited trials do not
fully appreciate the complicity of those not prosecuted. 466 While they do
provide a forum for establishing the truth about the past in broad strokes,
prosecutions of a few top leaders do not provide public acknowledgment for
most victims. Thus, they neither meet demands for truth nor do they avoid
4 67
the dangers of oblivion.
In most transitions these concerns have led to compromise programs
featuring limited prosecutions that focus on top leaders, amnesties, truth
commissions, and reparations. 4 68 Many European transitions have also
utilized lustration.4 69 Just as prosecutorial selections may be criticized as
compromises against justice, the other elements of hybrid programs are
usually seen as gap-filling strategies. 470 Together they seem to provide
only the best approximation of justice in a very imperfect world. 47 1 This
concluding part discusses how the excuse-centered approach resolves these
concerns while providing guidance and justification for truth commissions.
A. The Affirmative Defense Approach Guides and Justifies Prosecutorial
Selection
Structuring prosecutorial selectivity around an affirmative defense has
significant advantages in the context of transitional justice specifically and
transitions to democracy more generally, First, it requires substantial
engagement with abusers, victims, witnesses, and society. If the burden of
overcoming the defense fell on prosecutors then usual procedural
protections and natural motives of defendants to avoid punishment would
prevent a full hearing of the facts and circumstances. 472 By making the
defense affirmative, transitions put the burden of revelation on
defendants. 473 This provides individual motivation for pre-transitional bad

466. De Greiff, supra note 62, at 101-06.
467. Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 18-27; De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81-82.
468. Rotberg, supra note 9, at 3.
469. Boed, supra note 455, at 357; Mark Ellis, Purging the Past: The Current State of
LustrationLaws in the Former Communist Bloc, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at
181.
470. Hayner, supra note 38, at 12-14.
471. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 648.
472. Ronald C. Slye, Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South
African Amnesty Process, in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra
note 9, at 170, 173-77.
473. See Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in
Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 141, 148; Kiss, supra
note 23, at 76-77.
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actors to participate in revelatory processes such as truth
commissions,
474
dramatically enhancing the quality of the truth produced.
Second, making the defense affirmative gives prosecutors more control
over selections. Evidentiary limitations might force officials to forgo
prosecutions if defendants have a presumptive defense. Affirmative
defenses allow prosecutors to make principled decisions based on real
information rather than allowing circumstances to force them to make blind
choices or to provide de facto amnesties. 4 75 Selections made on rational
evidentiary grounds also preserve scarce prosecutorial and judicial
resources 4 76 while providing publicly justifiable reasons for prosecutorial
4 77
selections.
B. The TransitionalContributionsof Truth Commissions
Truth commissions have been integral parts of transitional justice
programs in many countries. 4 78 While a discussion of these procedures is
beyond the scope of this Article, some goals and aspirations of
commissions are described here to explain how they can be advanced by an
excuse-centered approach to transitional justice.
There are a number of truth commission models. 4 79 At base, however,
all share a common conviction: That construction of a publicly legitimate
and descriptively accurate account of the past is critical in transitions to
democracy. 480 What counts as "truth" in this context varies widely. 4 8 1 At a
minimum, truth commissions try to produce a detailed and accurate account
of what happened to whom, when, and how.4 82 Commissions also try to
determine who was implicated in past wrongs, 483 why atrocities were
committed, 484 and how perpetrators were able to pursue programs of

474. Slye, supra note 472, at 173-77; see also Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty's Justice, in
Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 189, 190-9 1.
475. De Greiff, supra note 6, at 81-82.
476. See Carroll, supra note 352, at 187-89 (describing the effects on the Rwandan justice
system of scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources); Huyse, supra note 38, at 107 (citing
justice concerns relating to the use of lay officials in France after World War 1I where there
were insufficient judicial resources).
477. De Greiff, supranote 6, at 81.
478. Hayner provided the first survey of contemporary truth commissions in Fifteen Truth
Commissions-]974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 Human Rts. Q. 597 (1994). She
expanded and deepened her study in Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and
Atrocity (2001).
479. Hayner, supra note 38, at 32-85, 305-13.
480. Id at 24-29; Rotberg, supra note 9, at 3; cf Film and Popular Memory: An
Interview with Michel Foucault, Cahiers du Cinema, July-Aug. 1974, at 251-52 (Fr.),
reprinted in Radical Philosophy, Summer 1975, at 24, 25-27 (Martin Jordin trans.)
(discussing twentieth-century revolutions and transitions).
481. Hayner, supra note 38, at 72-85.
482. Boraine, supranote 473, at 151; David A. Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A
Normative Framework, 99 Ethics & Int'l Aff. 43,49 (1999).
483. Boraine, supra note 473, at 151; Kiss, supra note 23, at 70-74.
484. Bhargava, supra note 99, at 57-58.

2006]

AN EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH

2683

destruction. 4 85 The mandate of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Committee, for example, was to "establish[] as complete a picture as
possible . . . including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context
of such violations as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives
and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the
4 86
violations."
The provision of a publicly acceptable account of the past serves several
transitional goals. Most prominent is prevention of future abuse. 4 87 By
uncovering the causes and circumstances of past abuses, transitional
regimes hope to develop new social norms and public procedures that will
reduce the chance of future violence. 488 In addition to content, then, truth
commissions provide important opportunities to model procedural
commitments violated under the old regime. 489 By publicizing accounts of
the past, commissions mark a break from abusive regimes, where opacity
490
and rarified power were essential tools of disarticulate power.
Commissions also offer recognition of victims and the wrongs they have
suffered,4 9 1 modeling transitional commitments to democratic principles of
49 2
recognition, inclusion, and participation.
Truth commissions count restoration and reconciliation high among their
goals. 493 By providing opportunities for past abusers to confess and for
victims to tell their stories truth commissions hope to reconcile a
transitional society with its past and to set the stage for victims to be
reconciled with their abusers. 4 94 Through this process of confrontation and
reconciliation truth commissions aspire to establish the conditions
necessary for social, political, and legal justice. 495 In addition, by
identifying what went wrong in the past 4 96 and charting new public norms
and procedures that will prevent future abuses 49 7 commissions establish and
model the public commitments that form the foundation upon which a new

485. Boraine, supra note 473, at 148.
486. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 s. 3(1)(a), 1 JSRSA
1-184 (2003). See generally Boraine, supra note 32.
487. Hayner, supra note 38, at 29-30; Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions,
Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in TransitionalSocieties, 35 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
661, 694-97 (2004).
488. Bhargava, supra note 99, at 45.

489. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 658.
490. Hayner, supra note 38, at 25.

491. Bhargava, supra note 99, at 54-56; De Greiff, supra note 6, at 93; Andre du Toit,
The Moral Foundationsof the South African TRC: Truth as Acknowledgment andJustice as
Recognition, in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 122,

135-39; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 658-661.
492.
42.
493.
494.
495.

See Bhargava, supra note 99, at 50-51; Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 35See generally Kiss, supra note 23, passim; Sarkin & Daly, supra note 487.
See generally Tutu, supranote 23; Minow, supra note 14, at 235.
De Greiff, supra note 62, at 105.

496. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 648.
497. Kiss, supra note 23, at 72.
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society committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law can be
498
built and sustained.
A publicly established truth about the past can also provide some
consequences for wrongdoers. 499 While criminal punishment is not part of
the truth commission process, 50 0 publicity provides a form of public
shaming. 50 1 By identifying wrongs and wrongdoers, often with the aid of
dramatic victim testimony and forensic reports, truth commissions also set
the stage for individuals to recognize what they have done and to assume
moral accountability for the past.50 2 This educative function of truth
procedures is aided by victim participation, 50 3 providing obvious benefits
50 4
for prevention and restoration.
Civil society should play a critical role in and be a significant beneficiary
of truth commissions. 50 5 South Africa provides a good example. 50 6 There,
daily events were broadcast and nightly analyses conducted.5 0 7 The
processes of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as its daily
product, were publicly accessible and were the source and topic of9
50
significant discussion and debate. 508 Nigeria took a similar approach.
This daily presence encourages truth seeking outside of the commission
while working to prevent oblivion, denial, and revisionism. Public truth
commissions also provide a model for civil 5society,
establishing the
10
groundwork of a transparent politics of inclusion.
These varied goals require that commissions regard "truth" as
multifaceted.5 1 1 A primary benefit of commissions, as compared to
criminal trials, 5 12 is a freedom from rules of evidence and other procedural
limitations on testimony, including rights against self-incrimination and
limitations on hearsay evidence. 513 Truth commissions can afford these
looser protocols because they cannot, by definition, result in individualized
498. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 35-42.
499. Dumisa B. Ntsebeza, The Uses of Truth Commissions: Lessons for the World, in
Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, supra note 9, at 158, 163-65; van Zyl,
supra note 5, at 662.
500. Kiss, supra note 23, at 79 (citing Desmond Tutu's introduction to the final report of
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC")).
501. Ntsebeza, supra note 499, at 163-65; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 662-63; see also
Douglas N. Husak, Already PunishedEnough, 18 Phil. Topics 79 (1990).

502. Kiss, supranote 23, at 74-79.
503. Van Zyl, supranote 5, at 647-58.
504. Id.
505. Hayner, supra note 38, at 234-39; Crocker, supra note 140, at 109-14; du Toit, supra
note 491, at 129.
506. Rotberg, supra note 9, at 13.
507. See van Zyl, supra note 5, at 653-56.
508. Crocker, supra note 140, at 113.
509. Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of

TransitionalJustice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 89, 14041(2001).
510. See du Toit, supra note 491, at 124-26.
511. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 33-42; see van Zyl, supra note 5, at 667.
512. Aukerman, supra note 4, at 74-75.
513. See generally Levinson, supra note 105.
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criminal sanctions. 514 Truth commissions provide plenty of room for
normative evaluation, however. Assessment of right and wrong is critical
to acknowledging what happened, recognizing the suffering of victims, and
striking a contrast between past and future. 5 15 The latitude afforded to truth
commissions also provides the opportunity to hear from a wide variety of
sources, including victims, witnesses, and abusers. 516 Further, testimony
can take the form of narratives of personal experience. 5 17 This flexibility
expands the scope of truth while
offering recognition to those whose stories
5 18
were suppressed and ignored.
Commissions need not produce a final decision or reflect a perfect
consensus. 5 19 Given the broad scope of commissions, consensus may well
be impossible. 5 20 A consensus truth might also fail to capture the
complexity of the past. 52 1 This is not a disadvantage. Destruction of
diverse opinion is, after all, a hallmark of abusive regimes. 522 Forcing
commissions to pursue a consensus view is, in this light, radically
undemocratic. 523 What truth commissions can do is provide a shared
experience of pursuit and, by conducting themselves in the light of
transitional commitments to human rights and the rule of law, create a
524
shared "universe of comprehensibility" of the past.
Finally, truth commissions seek to define new social, political, and
individual normative identities. Anthony Duff and Jean Hampton, among
others, have argued that trials play an important role in society by
expressing and reaffirming social and legal commitments. 5 25 For these
theorists the process of trial and punishment is a process of re-presenting
social norms and expressing approbation and condemnation.
Truth
commissions have the same potential, though their orientation is
52 6
prospective and aspirational rather than retrospective.
C. An Excuse-CenteredApproach Justifies and Organizes Truth
Commissions
The excuse-centered approach to transitional justice proposed here
provides important structural guidance and motivational support for truth
commissions. It also advances the goals and opportunities of truth
514. Aukerman, supra note 4, at 49. But see Hayner, supra note 38, at 107-09, 127-32.
515. Hayner, supra note 38, at 29-30.
516. Minow, supra note 14, at 239; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 657.
517. Boraine, supra note 473, at 152; Kiss, supranote 23, at 70.
518. Kiss, supra note 23, at 72-74; Minow, supra note 14, at 239.
519. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 32, 35-42.
520. Id. at 34-35.
521. Id.
522. Malamud-Goti, supra note 29, at 72-83.
523. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 32-33.
524. Kader Asmal et al., Reconciliation Through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid's
Criminal Governance 46 (1996).
525. Duff, supra note 164, at 124-26; Hampton, supra note 68, at 208.
526. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 70-79; De Greiff, supra note 62, at 95.
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commissions while avoiding the most pernicious objections to these
procedures and the amnesties they imply.
Within the rule of law embraced by transitions, prosecutors carry the
burden of proof.527 Affirmative defenses represent an exception to this
rule. Defendants who assert an affirmative defense must prove the elements
of the proposed defense. 5 28 Truth commissions are ideal forums for
developing the record needed to make these selections, particularly if those
who seek to avoid prosecution must testify about what happened, what they
did, and why. 529 They cannot be taken at their word, of course.
Commissioners must investigate these accounts by hearing additional
testimony and by examining relevant evidence. 530 After the investigation is
complete, commissioners operating within the excuse-centered approach
would make recommendations to prosecutors, who have final authority to
act based on their independent judgment. 531
A model of transitional justice that requires testimony at a truth
commission as a prerequisite for securing immunity from prosecution may
seem to create motivational 532 and, perhaps, due process problems. 533.
These concerns are easily salved by "use immunity" and "derivative useimmunity" arrangements. 534 Within these agreements, prosecutors may not
use information learned from compelled testimony to prosecute their case
535
against the accused.
This excuse-centered structure enhances significantly the truth-seeking
potential of commissions. Because commissioners cannot produce a
verdict, their recommendations to prosecutors are not binding, and the
evidence they produce is not accessible for prosecutions, commissions are
free of the constraints and pressures of evidentiary rules and due process
protections. This freedom from constraints allows commissions to develop
527. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970).
528. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977).
529. This is similar to the requirement for amnesty imposed by South Africa's TRC. See
Boraine, supra note 473, at 148-49 (describing former President F.W. de Klerk's appearance
before the TRC); Ntsebeza, supra note 499, at 163-64; Slye, supra note 472, at 173-77; van
Zyl, supra note 5, at 653-56 (providing an overview of the TRC).
530. See van Zyl, supra note 5, at 655 ("If the crime was a gross violation of human
rights, the Amnesty Committee had to conduct a public hearing before granting amnesty.").
531. This approach is similar to that adopted by the TRC in South Africa, see id. at 65356, and by the Committee for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor. Comm.
for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor, On the Establishment of a
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, §§ 24, 32-33, 38, 40,
UNTAET/REG/2001/10 (July 13, 2001).
532. With perjury and contempt, self-incrimination forms what Justice Arthur J. Goldberg
has called the "cruel trilemma." Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S.
52, 55 (1964).
533. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Committee recognized this concern and
acknowledged that it was sacrificing strict due process protections in favor of truth. See 1
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, supra note 63, at 174-200
(describing legal challenges to the TRC).
534. See, e.g., Tribunals of Inquiry Act (1990) Cap. 447, § 8 (Nigeria).
535. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (holding that use and derivative use
immunity are coextensive with the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
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more detailed and complete accounts of the past than would be possible in a
criminal trial. 5 36

Rather than establishing what truth they can within

procedural constraints, commissioners can, and should, concentrate on
developing an extensive and detailed account of what happened, who was
involved, and why. These open procedures produce accounts of the past
that are broader, deeper, more detailed, more accessible, more acceptable,
537
and more legitimate in the public eye than would be possible in trials.
Unlike criminal trials, truth commissions organized for the purpose of
making prosecutorial selections provide a compelling motivational structure
that supports truth seeking. 538 First, by virtue of the formal separation
between commissions and trials, nothing a former abuser says in a truth
commission procedure can be used against him. Second, where admitting
crimes in a criminal trial brings the promise of punishment, admitting
abuses before a truth commission offers hope of security from prosecution.
Third, abusers know that lies and omissions may leave them vulnerable to
future prosecution. 539 Finally, because testimony cannot be used to
prosecute others, witnesses, including both victims and abusers, need not
fear reprisals. Truth commissions, unlike criminal trials, do not limit the
form of victims' testimony, nor are victims subjected to aggressive crossexamination. 540 Instead, victims tell their stories in their own ways,
allowing a moment of public acknowledgment denied by oppressive
54 1
regimes and by trials, where the focus is on the defendant and his rights.
This, then, is the outline of how the excuse-centered approach would
function procedurally within a broader transitional justice program. Open
truth commission procedures, protected by use-immunity safeguards, would
provide a forum for developing a full account of the past. As the process
goes along commissioners make recommendations to prosecutors regarding
who should and should not benefit from the proposed affirmative excuse.
Prosecutors would make the final decision. Any bargains accepted by
prosecutors would ultimately be subject to revocation if later discoveries
revealed that an abuser had withheld significant facts about his past bad
acts. 542 Alternatively, if officials decide to prosecute an abuser based on or
despite the recommendations of commissioners, then they would not be
allowed to make investigative or prosecutorial use of testimony or evidence
presented to a commission.
536. Rotberg, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that amnesty, not freedom from constraints,
allows a more complete account of the period before transition).
537. De Greiff, supra note 62, at 105 ("The history [of the former regime] should
describe not only the fate of the victims, but also the institutional aspects of repression, and,
specially, its sources of support."); Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 32-42.
538. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 26-27; Kiss, supra note 23, at 76-77.
539. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission imposed this rule. See Kiss, supra note
23, at 76.
540. See Kamali, supra note 509, at 140-41 (noting that the adversarial structure of the
Nigerian truth commission severely diminished its reliability).
541. See du Toit, supra note 491, at 122.
542. Cf Kiss, supra note 23, at 76 (noting denial of amnesty to perpetrators who failed to
fully disclose their actions).
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D. An Excuse-CenteredApproach Resolves Dilemmas of Truth
Commissions
Truth commissions propose a "trade-off' between justice as either
criminal punishment or truth. 543 To minimize what is lost in this trade-off,
advocates for commissions have developed jurisprudential theories
designed to satisfy the call for justice in transitions. 544 Professors Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that these theories must satisfy three
minimal demands.5 45 First, commissions must appeal to a moral principle
that is at least comparable to the moral principle of punishment sacrificed in
the trade-off.546
Second, commissions, to reflect commitments to
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and to maximize the public
legitimacy of the truth they produce, must be inclusive and broad in
spectrum, providing an opportunity for recognition and participation to as
many individuals as possible, including both victims and abusers. 547 Third,
commissions must develop morally rich practices that reflect their
principled goals but also provide a model for democratic and rule of law
procedures going forward. 548 The second and third requirements are simple
design challenges. The more difficult task is to provide a morally satisfying
justification for the "trade-off."
Theories of "restorative justice" have
54 9
emerged as the most common response.
The central insight of restorative justice in the transitional context is that
pre-transitional abuses are symptoms of social and political pathologies.
Liberal revolutions represent breaks with the past. Restorative procedures
provide a path to the future by laying the groundwork for social, political,
and legal change. 550 In addition, they seek to produce shifts in public
institutions and the public and private consciousnesses of citizens. 55 1 The
ultimate goal, of course, is to reconcile a transitional society with its past
and to reconcile victims with their abusers in order to prepare the ground
for a stable society dedicated to democracy, human rights, and the rule of
55 2
law.

543. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 22-24.
544. Kiss, supra note 23, at 68. This effort has been aided by recent contributions from
traditional criminal theory circles. See, e.g., Gerry Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas,
Values, Debates (2002); Restorative Justice and the Law (Lone Walgrave ed., 2002).
Restorative justice presents numerous promises and problems, a full discussion of which
must wait for a later time.
545. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 22-23.
546. Id. at 23, 27.
547. Id.at 23.
548. Id. at 23-24.
549. See Asmal et al., supra note 524, at 12-27; 1 Truth and Reconciliation Commission
of South Africa Report, supra note 63, 103-34; Tutu, supranote 23, passim; Kiss, supranote
23, at 68-69; Llewellyn, supra note 23, at 96-111.
550. See Sarkin & Daly, supra note 487, at 697-700; van Zyl, supra note 5, at 667.
551. Minow, supra note 14, at 243-45 (discussing the effects on private consciousness).
552. See id. at 250-52 (discussing reconciliation efforts of the TRC); van Zyl, supra note
5, at 667.
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Criminal punishment represents, in the restorative justice scheme, both a
failure to appreciate the unique features of past abuses and a practical threat
to the success of transition. 5 53 So viewed, broad programs of prosecution
conflict, theoretically and practically, with transitional demands to restore
554
or create the conditions necessary to ensure the success of a new regime.
Given this conflict, restorative justice advocates argue that establishment of
a stable post-transitional society provides a moral imperative that trumps
555
obligations to punish.
In place of punishment, restorative justice seeks to restore or create the
social conditions necessary to ensure the success of transition. 5 56 Truth
commissions, by focusing on admission and contrition 557 rather than
adversarial prosecution and punishment, better reflect the demands of
restorative justice. 5 58 In addition, if commissions conduct their business
carefully, they can construct a foundation for transitional commitments to
human rights and the rule of law and provide a model for democratic
procedures. 559 These goals, along with more purely practical demands
bound up with resource allocation and stability, 560 justify the truth-forjustice trade-off.
The restorative rationale for truth commissions presents serious concerns.
While a full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
enough for now to recognize that even these hopeful theories must live with
sighs of resignation lurking in the background.5 6 1
Whether truth
commissions mean to fill in the gaps or to provide an exclusive alternative
to trials, theorists and practitioners admit that something is being given
up. 562 Public admission and even public shame are not what most think
about when they call for punishing abusers. 56 3 Solace taken from
restorative justice theories is just that. Truth commissions retain the
'564
damning label "best possible approximation [of justice].
Truth commissions conducted within an excuse-centered approach need
not wither in this darkness. Suggestions that commissions involve a trade553. See Aukerman, supra note 4, at 66.
554. See generally Erin Daly, TransformativeJustice: Chartinga Path to Reconciliation,
12 Int'l Legal Persp. 73 (2002).
555. See Minow, supra note 36, at 91-92; Tutu, supra note 23.
556. See generally Tutu, supra note 23; Kiss, supra note 23, at 68.
557. Neither contrition nor forgiveness can be forced, of course, and the success of
commissions should be contingent on neither. See Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton,
Forgiveness and Mercy 80, 149 (1988) (discussing forgiveness, resentment, and hatred, and
the retributive idea); Minow, supra note 14, at 249.
558. See Kiss, supranote 23, at 79-83.
559. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 35-42 (discussing democratic reciprocity
and the economy of moral disagreement).
560. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 648-53 (discussing the practical constraints that transitions
face).
561. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 22-26 (discussing the "moral burden" of
truth commissions).
562. Rotberg, supranote 9, at 7.
563. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 25.
564. Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 310 (alteration in original).
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off are only sensible if one assumes that those offered amnesty should be
punished, but, due to circumstances, cannot be. Within the excuse-centered
approach those implicated in past wrongs are invited to participate in truthseeking procedures, along with victims, witnesses, and other relevant
sources, to determine what justice demands. Provision of an excuse within
this model is, by definition, in accord with the demands of justice. Thus,
truth commissions conducted in service of an excuse-centered approach do
not trade truth for justice; they elicit truth in the service of justice.
Provision of an excuse does not imply an exchange of punishment for truth
because those who qualify for the affirmative excuse should not be
punished.
None of this discussion minimizes the significant benefits to transitions
that truth commissions may bring in terms of restoration and other
important goals. The point is that from within an excuse-centered approach
these goals do not provide primary justification for truth commissions.
Rather, the excuse-centered approach serves criminal justice needs first.
Commissions are justified for their service to prosecutorial selection. This
is what justifies their place in a transitional justice program.
This brief discussion does not claim to address sufficiently all of the
intriguing issues raised by truth commissions in the context of transitional
justice. It is meant only to present some of the most significant concerns to
explain how an affirmative excuse-centered approach can provide structural
and theoretical support for commissions. It also points out some of the
features that commissions, conducted at the service of prosecutorial
selections, must have. While further discussion of the issues raised in this
section would be well worth the time spent, it is beyond the narrow scope of
this Article. The present purpose is only to provide a schematic account of
the role that truth commissions play in a transitional-justice strategy guided
by the proposed affirmative defense.
CONCLUSION

This Article has defended the proposition that most of those implicated in
wrongs committed by and under abusive regimes should not be subject to
criminal prosecution. It has argued that the prevailing social, legal, and
political conditions characteristic of abusive regimes provide good reason to
excuse those who acted consistently with an abusive public face of law.
Provision of this excuse does not deny that those implicated in pretransitional abuses have done wrong. They certainly have. Consistent with
this fact, the excuse preserves room for assignments of moral and political
guilt. 565
None of this discussion makes past events disappear. Clarifying the
standing of law and public agents in transitions does not meet all
transitional justice requirements. It does, however, provide a better picture
565. Jaspers, supra note 192, at 112-17 (discussing the way of purification in post-Hitler
Germany).
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of what a full transitional justice program might look like. First, it will be
centered on extending and developing transitional reforms committed to
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. 566 Second, the process must
provide for the constructive participation of all those affected by these
changes, including those who claim the legality defense. 567 Third,
transitional justice programs must provide opportunities for citizens to
transition into their new public roles. 56 8 Public agents are candidates for
change just as are public norms. They should be recognized as participants
569
in the process.
Truth commissions, as part of the excuse-centered approach, fit the
unique conditions of transitions. Transitions must justify and establish new
57 1 to
public norms. 570 This implies adopting a coordinative orientation
most involved in events of the past while retaining the goal of social
expression that is central to both the justification and application of public
law. 572 By putting a priority on establishing facts while acknowledging that
most participants in past events cannot be held criminally liable truth
commissions reflect this premium on coordination.
Transitions are not wholly coordinative enterprises, of course. As in
functioning democracies, there are coercive outcomes. Those who disagree
with changes in public consciousness and norms cannot opt for the old
ways. There is another aspect to the focus on public agency that comes to
the fore here. Even Kant, perhaps the staunchest of the legal deontologists,
understood that law has an instrumental character. 573 In and after
transitions the mark of public agency provides for the possibility that those
who acted in accord with the public face of law in the past will do the same
when the law changes. At least, absent compelling evidence to the
contrary, a transitional regime should assume that they will.
The provision of an affirmative defense for most pre-transitional bad
actors also preserves the possibility of reparations for victims of the past
regime. 574 "Responsibility" is a notoriously difficult word. One use of
566. Ackerman, supra note 6, at 5-24 (providing a taxonomy of revolutions); Teitel,
supra note 16, at 215-19 (discussing a paradigm for transitional justice and transitional
jurisprudence).
567. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 35-38 (discussing democratic reciprocity).
568. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 666-67 ("[Commissions] generate a process of national
introspection that requires everyone ... [to] examine their role in the conflicts of the past.").
569. Slye, supra note 472, at 173-77.
570. De Greiff, supra note 62, at 105.
571. Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 18, at 38-42 (discussing the economy of moral
disagreement).
572. Duff, supra note 164, at 124-26, 235-45.
573. See Kant, supra note 283, at *232-33.
574. This discussion of reparations is meant only as a sketch. A full defense of
reparations would require much more. See Thomas McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewdltigung
in the USA: On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery, 30 Pol. Theory 623 (2002)
(discussing reparations); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparationsfor Slavery and
Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 689 (2003) (same); Thomas McCarthy,
Remarks on the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery (Oct. 28, 2005), available
at http://www.yale.edu/glc/justice/mccarthy.pdf (discussing moral guilt).
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responsibility is found in criminal law. "Responsible" can also have a
moral dimension, suggesting an act of free will for which the actor is held
to blame. 575
It can also have a political dimension. 576
Finally,
"responsibility" can have a looser meaning, more prominent in some
branches of tort law, that relies on cause as a key feature generating
responsibility to repair. 577 Forgoing criminal blame does not release
individuals from responsibility for contributing to the success and stability
of the new regime. First, though abusers may not be punished, they are still
morally culpable for their acts. 578 Second, recognizing that many agents of
harm in the past regime were acting according to the demands placed on
them in their public roles suggests that responsibility for many pre579
transitional abuses falls also on the society that made them possible.
Corresponding assignments of moral and political guilt provide ample
justification for reparations. 580 Individual duties to repair will vary, of
course. Citizens may bear a higher tax burden to pay for social programs
that benefit victims. 58 1 Corporations and states that realized gains by
colluding with an abusive regime may be required to return ill-gotten profits
and to contribute to reform and reparation programs. 582 Others may be
called upon to return land or other property appropriated under the eye of
the old guard. 583 What is important, however, is that these duties flow not
from criminal liability but from a recognition that abuses of the past would
575. See Jaspers, supranote 192, at 25-26, 57-64.
576. Van Zyl, supra note 5, at 667.
577. The famous example of the ship's captain, provided by Hart in his postscript to
Punishmentand Responsibility, captures much of the spectrum:
As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of his passengers and
crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and was responsible for the
loss of the ship with all aboard. It was rumored that he was insane, but the doctors
considered that he was responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage he
behaved quite irresponsibly and various incidents in his career showed that he was
not a responsible person. He always maintained that the exceptional winter storms
were responsible for the loss of the ship, but in the legal proceedings brought
against him he was found criminally responsible for his negligent conduct, and in
separate civil proceedings he was held legally responsible for the loss of life and
property. He is still alive and he is morally responsible for the deaths of many
women and children.
Hart, supra note 198, at 211 (internal quotation omitted).
578. See Jaspers, supranote 192, at 57-64; Kiss, supra note 23, at 76.
579. Jaspers, supra note 192, at 69-75; Bhargava, supra note 99, at 60-63; Kiss, supra
note 23, at 78.
580. I leave a full account of how this is so to another day.
581. This has been a part of reparations programs in the United States, proposed and
actual. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b (2000); Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your
Own Front Door: Examining the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations,
147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 677 (1999); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of
Reparations to African Americans, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 597 (1993); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations: JapaneseAmerican Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. Rev.
477 (1998).
582. Rosenfeld, supra note 12, at 324-27 (dismissing the case for "some" restitution).
583. Ben Hlatshwayo, Land Expropriation Laws in Zimbabwe and Their Compatibility
with InternationalLegal Norms, 11 Zimb. L. Rev. 41 (1993). But see Jeremy Waldron,
Superseding HistoricInjustice, 103 Ethics 2 (1992).
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not have occurred but for the complicity of an abusive society, its members,
and enablers.
As a practical matter, the excuse-centered approach advanced here does
not suggest radical changes to transitional justice practice. Due to the
unique circumstances that define transitional justice most transitional
regimes adopt hybrid strategies that look much like the program
What the excuse-centered approach offers is
recommended here.
justification and guidance for what otherwise are ad hoc strategies that
appear to involve significant compromises against justice. By providing a
detailed excuse and defending its elements against common concerns that
circulate through transitional justice debates this Article has attempted to
provide practical as well as theoretical guidance for practitioners faced with
the unique challenges of seeking justice in transitions.

Notes & Observations

